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THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE
AFTER JAFFEE V. REDMOND: WHERE DO WE
GO FROM HERE?
ANNE BOWEN POULIN*
I. INTRODUCTION
In Jaffee v. Redmond,' the United States Supreme Court recognized a
psychotherapist-patient privilege in federal common law. The Court,
however, failed to define the parameters of the privilege and left the
refinement of the common-law definition for the lower federal courts2 to
make on a case-by-case basis. A forward look may help guide that process to
a consistent set of rules.
Both the Court and Congress can be criticized for their approaches to
federal privilege law. Congress can be faulted for abdicating responsibility
for privilege law because it categorically refused to codify privilege law
when it enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence. Privilege law is peculiarly
suited for statutory treatment; it embodies policy choices and details of
application that are best addressed by the legislature. Unlike Congress, most
states define privileges almost entirely through statutes. Moreover, the Court
can also be faulted for capitulating to Congress and then later adopting new
privileges in the federal common law, rather than originally deferring
complete responsibility to Congress. That critique, however, is not the
subject of this Article. Instead, this Article takes the federal structure as a
given: Congress has not acted, and the Court has recognized the
psychotherapist-patient privilege as a federal common-law privilege. This
Article addresses questions that must be answered to determine the
parameters of the privilege.
Privileges are fragile sources of protection. If information is fully
privileged, it receives absolute protection from disclosure. In the law of
privilege, important individual and social interests compete with the desire to
* Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law. I am grateful to my colleagues for
their helpful comments, particularly to Leonard Packel, Richard Turkington, and Ellen Wertheimer. I
am also indebted to Anthony Yacullo, Cam Leheny, and Rebecca Craggs for their research assistance
and to Villanova University School of Law for its generous support.
1. 518U.S. 1(1996).
2. See id. at 18 (remarking "it is neither necessary nor feasible to delineate its full contours in a
way that would 'govern all conceivable future questions in this area."' (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United
States, 449 U.S. 383, 386 (1981))).
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discern the truth of a case by assembling all the testimony and documents
that bear on the facts. Therefore, courts often construe privileges narrowly.
Given the competing interests and the nature of privilege protection, the
federal courts must strike the proper balance as they develop the common-
law psychotherapist-patient privilege. Not all courts have done so. Some
courts have applied the privilege where a counseling relationship did not
warrant such protection. Other courts have given the privilege too little
effect. This Article addresses the issues courts will encounter as they develop
the psychotherapist-patient privilege. After reviewing existing approaches,
this Article suggests the course courts should follow as they construe the
federal common-law privilege.
II. SOURCES OF GUIDANCE
When the Court promulgated rules of evidence, culminating in 1975 with
the statutory adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Court also
proposed rules to govern the federal law of privilege. While retaining most of
the other proposed rules of evidence with some modifications, Congress
deleted the proposed rules pertaining to privilege. Instead, Congress adopted3
a single rule addressing privilege. Rule 501 provides:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States
or provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme
Court pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness,
person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be
governed by the principles of the common law as they may be
interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and
experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to
an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the
rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State,
or political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance with
State law.
4
Thus, under Rule 501, the law of privilege is governed by federal common
law in combination with state law.5 Jaffee represents an important step in the
development of the federal common law of privilege. It establishes a strong
3. See generally Developments in the Law-Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV.
1454, 1463-70 (1985) [hereinafter Developments] (summarizing history of adoption of federal rule).
4. FED.R.EVD.501.
5. See generally Developments, supra note 3; Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Federalism and Federal Rule
ofEvidence 501: Privilege and Vertical Choice ofLaw, 82 GEO. L.L 1781 (1994).
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privilege for therapeutic relationships. The lower courts, however, are left to
define the federal psychotherapist-patient privilege. In doing so, they should
turn to several sources for guidance: the Jaffee decision itself, the proposed
but rejected Federal Rules of Evidence, federal statutes that define privilege-
like protection for other types of information, state privilege law, and the
codes of professional conduct governing therapists.
A. Jaffee v. Redmond
The Court's decision in Jaffee demonstrates the intention to establish a
strong psychotherapist-patient privilege. Courts facing the task of defining
the privilege should therefore interpret the privilege as providing substantial
protection in those instances in which the privilege applies.
Jaffee emphasized the role of trust in psychotherapy. Noting that effective
psychotherapy requires an "atmosphere of confidence and trust" and that the
problems discussed with the therapist are often sensitive, the Court
concluded that "the mere possibility of disclosure may impede development
of the confidential relationship necessary for successful treatment.",6 Because
therapy relies not only on disclosure of factual information, but also on
revelations that expose emotions, fears, and fantasies, the psychotherapist-
patient relationship surpasses even the attorney-client relationship in its need
for protection.
The Court also stressed the societal benefit derived from effective
psychotherapy. The Court placed mental health on equal footing with
physical health, characterizing each as "a public good of transcendent
importance." 7 The Court further underscored the strength of the privilege by
extending the traditional protection to therapy provided by a licensed social
worker.
In addition, the Court rejected the balancing approach adopted by the
court of appeals. The Seventh Circuit in Jaffee recognized the
psychotherapist-patient privilege but applied a balancing test to determine its
effect. The Seventh Circuit held that the privilege would not apply if "in the
interests of justice, the evidentiary need for the disclosure of the contents of a
patient's counseling sessions outweighs that patient's privacy interests."8 The
6. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 10.
7. Id. at 11.
8. Jaffee v. Redmond, 51 F.3d 1346, 1357 (7th Cir. 1995); see also In re Doe, 964 F.2d 1325,
1329 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that "the privilege amounts only to a requirement that a court give
consideration to a witness's privacy interests as an important factor to be weighed in the balance in
considering the admissibility of psychiatric histories or diagnoses"). In Jaffee, the court of appeals
nonetheless held that the communications in the case were privileged because the evidentiary need for
1998] 1343
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Supreme Court emphasized the need for predictability and commented that
the balancing approach would "eviscerate the effectiveness of the privilege."
9
The Court concluded that the privilege's protection would be too uncertain if
each case could be subjected to balancing the interest in privacy against the
need for the evidence.10 In sum, the Court established a strong privilege. The
Court signaled this in both the statement of underlying rationale and the
resolution of questions of application addressed in Jaffee. That signal should
guide the lower federal courts as they construe the parameters of the
privilege.
B. Proposed Rules
The Court's own proposed but rejected Rule 504 should guide
development of the common law." As proposed, the rule provided:
A patient has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other
person from disclosing confidential communications, made for the
purposes of diagnosis or treatment of his mental or emotional
condition, including drug addiction, among himself, his
psychotherapist, or person who are participating in the diagnosis or
treatment under the direction of the psychotherapist, including
members of the patient's family.'
2
Although the Proposed Rule should help guide the courts, Jaffee signals
unequivocally that the Proposed Rule is not a blueprint for federal common-
law development. In Jaffee, even as it recognized the existence of the
privilege, the Court parted ways with the Proposed Rule's definition of the
privilege. Although the Proposed Rule extended the privilege only to
psychiatrists and psychologists, Jaffee extended the privilege to social
workers as well. This extension of the privilege beyond that originally
proposed in Rule 504 demonstrates the limited persuasive force of the
Proposed Rule.'
3
the communications was not great and the privacy interests were substantial. See 51 F.3d at 1357-58.
9. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 17.
10. See id. at 18.
11. See generally United States v. King, 73 F.R.D. 103, 105 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) ("Guidance in this
continuing task is provided by consideration of the rationale and specific language of the detailed rules
of privileges as promulgated by the Supreme Court.").
12. FED. R. EVID. 504(b) (proposed Nov. 20, 1972).
13. Cf. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980) (revealing complete willingness to depart
from proposed rules of privilege). In Trammel, the Court defined the protection against adverse
spousal testimony more narrowly than Proposed Rule 504 and recognized in dicta the privilege
protecting confidential marital communications, which had been omitted from the proposed rule. See
(VOL. 76:1341
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C. Other Federal Statutes
Although Congress declined to comprehensively address issues of
privilege in the Federal Rules of Evidence, it has enacted statutes that attach
privilege-like protection to specific records or relationships. 14 Such statutes
may inform the development of the common-law privilege. Although they do
not serve as models for common-law approaches, these statutes may provide
insight into congressional choices, and some provisions may be incorporated
into the common law.' 5 More importantly, the existing statutes should
encourage the Court to minimize its reliance on common law as the source of
privilege protection. The statutes demonstrate that Congress addresses
matters of privilege when it has the will. The statutory provisions'
complexity bolsters the argument that some privileges should be defined only
by statute. A consideration of federal legislation may therefore lead courts to
deflect some claims of privilege, waiting for an expression of congressional
judgment.
D. State Law
Courts should also look to state law for guidance as they develop the
federal privilege. In Jaffee, the Court concluded that "the existence of a
consensus among the States indicates that 'reason and experience' support
recognition of the privilege.' ' 16 It also stressed the relationship between
federal and state privilege protection, noting that "any State's promise of
confidentiality would have little value if the patient were aware that the
id. at 51.
14. See, e.g., IRS Restructuring & Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 3411, 112 Stat.
750 (establishing privilege for tax advice to taxpayers from qualified nonlawyers); 38 U.S.C. § 7332
(1994) (establishing privilege for certain information obtained when processing veteran benefit claims
regarding AIDS, substance abuse, and sickle cell anemia); 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2 (1994) (establishing
privilege for confidential information communicated in course of federal substance abuse programs);
42 U.S.C. § 300b-3 (1994) (conditioning receipt of federal research grant on assurance that
confidentiality of tests, records, diagnosis, and counseling of patient is maintained unless patient
consents to disclosure or patient identity is redacted); In re August 1993 Regular Grand Jury, 854 F.
Supp. 1380 (S.D. Ind. 1994) (applying 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2). See generally Richard C. Turkington,
Medical Record Confidentiality Law, Scientific Research, and Data Collection in the Information Age,
25 J. L., MED. & ETHICS 113 (1997).
15. See, e.g., Michael B. Bressman & Fernando R. Laguarda, Jaffee v. Redmond: Towards
Recognition of a Federal Counselor-Battered Woman Privilege, 30 CREIGHTON L. REv. 319, 341-46
(1997) (arguing that federal courts should consider congressional assessment reflected in Violence
Against Women Act in deciding whether to extend privilege protection to counselor-battered woman
relationships).
16. Jaffe v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 13 (1995).
13451998]
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privilege would not be honored in a federal court." 17 Thus, although state
interpretations of the privilege do not bind the federal courts, they may
inform federal common law concerning the appropriate parameters of
privilege protection. In particular, the federal courts should look to those state
courts that give strong effect to their psychotherapist-patient privileges.
At least one commentator criticized Jaffee on the ground that the Court
was influenced too much by state law.' 8 The Court's expression of comity,
however, should not be exaggerated. Jaffee does not reflect unthinking
capitulation to state statutory law. Instead, Jaffee's consideration of state law
was appropriate, and the federal courts should continue to consider various
state law approaches to determine the contours of the psychotherapist-patient
privilege.
The precise relationship between state law privileges and federal litigation
has been a matter of dispute.' 9 A full consideration of this dispute is beyond
the scope of this Article. Rule 501 clearly provides that when state
substantive law governs, state privilege law applies as well. The dispute
arises when federal substantive law governs at least some aspects of the case.
Even in some cases governed by federal substantive law and, hence, federal
privilege law, a cogent argument can be made that federal courts should
enforce the privilege protection afforded under state privilege law.20 Some
courts have accepted arguments based on state law and have applied state
privileges in federal actions as a matter of comity, concluding that the
beneficial impact of state privilege law would be undesirably attenuated if
the privileged information could be discovered in federal litigation.21
The prevailing approach, however, is that Rule 501 requires the federal
courts to develop a uniform and freestanding federal common law of
privilege.22 Under this approach, the federal rule cannot reasonably
17. Id.
18. See The Supreme Court, 1995 Term-Leading Cases, 110 HARV. L. REv. 135, 287-97 (1996)
(criticizing Jaffee Court's "deferral to state legislatures for guidance" and predicting that federal courts
will look to state law to define federal privilege, producing through process "moley" and
unpredictable privilege).
19. See Developments, supra note 3, at 1464. See generally Dudley, supra note 5 (defining and
discussing reasons for when federal or state law is appropriate source to influence Federal Rules of
Evidence and their application).
20. See Dudley, supra note 5, at 1788.
21. See, e.g., Brem v. DeCarlo, Lyon, Heam & Pazourek, P.A., 162 F.R.D. 94 (D. Md. 1995);
Komlosi v. New York State Office of Mental Retardation & Dev. Disabilities, No. 88 Civ. 1792 (JFK),
1992 WL 77544 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 1992); Mewbom v. Heckler, 101 F.R.D. 691 (D.D.C. 1984);
Apicella v. McNeil Lab., Inc., 66 F.R.D. 78 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); see also, e.g., Doe v. St. Joseph's Hosp.,
Civ. A. No. F 83-201, 1987 WL 15462 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 18, 1987) (applying state statute but finding
records not privileged).
22. See, e.g., United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360,370, 373 (1980) (rejecting arguments based
[VOL. 76:1341
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incorporate the varied provisions of different states' privileges if such
constructions fail to serve federal policies. A number of decisions reflect this
view.23 Most importantly, Jaffee establishes a freestanding psychotherapist-
patient privilege under federal common law. Therefore, this Article considers
state law as a source of guidance to the federal courts as they define the
contours of the federal privilege established in Jaffee.
When federal courts turn to state privilege law for guidance in
interpreting the federal psychotherapist-patient privilege, they should
consider that, in many states, the corresponding privilege is bolstered by
other protective laws. Many states have statutes that protect the privacy of
medical records.24 In addition, many states recognize physician-patient or
other privileges that may supplement the psychotherapist-patient privilege.
Using those principles, the federal courts will then be asked to extend the full
panoply of protections through a broad psychotherapist-patient privilege.
Although the federal courts cannot expect to achieve protection equal to that
provided by the many varied protections offered by the states, the federal
courts may discover instances when an expansive reading of the federal
privilege is appropriate to achieve the protection offered by the state scheme.
on comity and separation of powers that state law privilege should apply in federal proceeding); see
also, e.g., MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE IN A NUTSHELL § 501.1 (4th ed.
1996) (describing policy and rationale behind Rule 501).
23. See, e.g., Win. T. Thompson, Co. v. General Nutrition Corp., 671 F.2d 100, 104 (3d Cir.
1982) (holding that federal law favoring admissibility rather than state law privilege governed); Curtis
v. McHenry, 172 F.R1D. 162, 163-64 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (rejecting argument that state privilege for
police reports would "automatically apply in a federal question case in federal court," and defining
court's task as determining "if a similar privilege has been created by enough states so that it can fhirly
be characterized as a 'principle of common law' 'in the light of reason and experience"); Johnson v.
Nyack Hosp., 169 F.LD. 550, 558 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (rejecting argument that state peer review
privilege applied and stating that "the goal of the exercise is the informed determination of a single,
uniform federal law of evidentiary privileges"). According to the Johnson court, "state privilege law is
not to be ignored" but enters the equation merely to inform the determination of federal common law;
"[o]nly by forging independent rules of privilege after taking into account the policy determinations of
all of the states can the federal courts develop a uniform federal law of privilege." Id. at 559; see also
Vanderbilt v. Town of Chilmark, 174 F.R1D. 225, 226-27 (D. Mass. 1997) (summarizing authority and
concluding that federal privilege law applies when federal court is hearing both federal and state
claims).
24. See ARK. R EVID. 503 (stating that "patient has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to
prevent any other person from disclosing his medical records"); TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 510(b)(2)
("Records of identity, diagnosis, evaluation, or treatment of patient/client which are created or
maintained by a professional are confidential and shall not be disclosed.'); Commonwealth v. Eck, 605
A.2d 1248, 1252-53 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (applying Pennsylvania's psychotherapist-patient privilege
to records created in course of confidential relationship); see also WILLIAM H. ROACH, JR., THE
ASPEN HEALTH LAW CENTER, MEDICAL RECORDS AND THE LAW, 279-98 app. (2d ed. 1994) (listing
state statutes governing medical records).
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E. Professional Codes
In defining the parameters of the privilege, courts should consider any
relevant professional codes of ethics. But they should realize that these codes
have limited value as a source of specific guidance. Not only may codes vary
from state to state, but each mental health profession is guided by at least one
separate ethical code.25 Nevertheless, the professional codes governing
mental health professionals include two provisions that warrant the courts'
attention. First, each professional code imposes an ethical obligation of
confidentiality in at least some circumstances.26 The American Psychiatric
Association recognizes an obligation to maintain confidentiality in addition
to the obligation its members bear as physicians. The American
Psychological Association and two professional social work societies
promulgated codes recognizing the obligation of confidentiality. 28 Moreover,
each of the codes includes special provisions exhorting the professionals to
maintain confidentiality when conducting research or presenting a patient's
case to a professional group.29
Second, the codes direct the mental health professional to inform the
patient of the limits of confidentiality. The American Psychiatric Association
code directs the psychiatrist to caution the patient of the "connotations of
waiving the privilege" and to advise the client of the lack of confidentiality
when the consultation occurs in unprivileged circumstances. 30 Psychologists
are instructed that where appropriate they should "discuss with [clients] ...
the relevant limitations on confidentiality."3' Similarly, social workers have
an ethical obligation to "discuss with clients ... the nature of confidentiality
25. See LELAND C. SWENSON, PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW FOR THE HELPING PROFESSIONS 59 (2d
ed. 1997).
26. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS WITH ANNOTATIONS
ESPECIALLY APPLICABLE TO PSYCHIATRY § 4 (1981) [hereinafter AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N
PRINCIPLES]. In the cases ofIn re Subpoena No. 22, 709 A.2d 385, 391-92 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998), and
Rost v. State Board of Psychology, 659 A.2d 626, 629 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995), the courts discuss the
relationship between the legal concept of privilege and the professional obligation of confidentiality.
27. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N PRINCIPLES, supra note 26, § 4.
28. See AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS'N, ETHICAL PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGISTS AND CODE
OF CONDUCT § 5 (1992) (visited Oct. 13, 1998) <http://www.apa.org/ethics/code.html> [hereinafter
ETHICAL PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGISTS]; NATIONAL ASS'N OF SOCIAL WORKERS, CODE OF ETHICS
Standard 1.07 (visited Oct. 13, 1998) <http://www.naswdc.org/code.htm>; CLINICAL SOCIAL WORK
FEDERATION, CODE OF ETHICS Principle MII (1997) (visited Oct. 13, 1998) <http:
//www.cswf.org/clinical.html>.
29. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N PRINCIPLES, supra note 26, § 4; ETHICAL PRINCIPLES OF
PSYCHOLOGISTS, supra note 28, Standard 5.08; NATIONAL ASS'N OF SOCIAL WORKERS, supra note
28, Standard 1.07; CLINICAL SOCIAL WORK FEDERATION, supra note 28, Principle 11(d).
30. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N PRINCIPLES, supra note 26, § 4.
31. ETHICAL PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGISTS, supra note 28, Standard 5.01.
[VOL. 76:1341
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and limitations of clients' right to confidentiality."3 2
When asked to address the professional standards for attorneys, the Court
has been reluctant to defer to rules of professional conduct.33 Consequently,
the Court is not likely to defer to professional standards when the question
involves the confidentiality of information within a psychotherapist-patient
relationship. Those standards are both more diverse and more removed from
the judiciary's experience than the rules of professional conduct for
attorneys. Courts, however, should at least review the codes and consider
possible applications to the psychotherapist-patient privilege.
34
The professional codes provide key information for courts. The codes
suggest that mental health professionals are likely to maximize the benefit of
the psychotherapist-patient privilege, combining awareness of the privilege
with their professional obligation of confidentiality to enhance the trust and
open communication component of therapy. The codes also convey the
importance of defining the privilege quickly and clearly, since the
professionals cannot fulfill their obligation to inform their patients of the
extent of confidentiality in the relationship unless the parameters of the
privilege are well-defined.
H. SELECTED PROBLEMS OF DEFINITION: SCOPE ISSUES
A. Relationships Covered
In Jaffee, the Court departed from the Proposed Rule's definition of the
relationships covered by the privilege. Rule 504 extended the privilege to
therapy conducted by licensed or certified psychologists and persons
"authorized to practice medicine in any state or nation, or reasonably
believed by the patient so to be, while engaged in the diagnosis or treatment
of a mental or emotional condition, including drug addiction."35 In Jaffee, the
Court not only held that the privilege extended to "confidential
communications made to licensed psychiatrists and psychologists," but also
32. NATIONAL ASS'N SOCIAL WORKERS, supra note 28, Standard 1.07(e).
33. See, e.g., Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 301-02 (1988). In Patterson, the dissenters
argued that "[t]he Court should not condone unethical forms of trial preparation by prosecutors." Id. at
301 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The majority found that privately interviewing a represented defendant
did not violate the Sixth Amendment. Justice Stevens unsuccessfully argued that the prosecutor's
actions breached the professional ethics established in the ABA's Code of Professional Conduct and
that the Sixth Amendment threshold should be equally demanding.
34. For example, in Jaffee, the Court cited the professional codes to establish the proposition that
an ethical therapist must disclose to the patient limits on confidentiality. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518
U.S. 1, 12-13 & nn.1 1-12 (1996).
35. FED. R. EVID. 504(a)(2) (proposed Nov. 20, 1972).
1998] 1349
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held that "the federal privilege should also extend to confidential
communications made to licensed social workers in the course of
psychotherapy. 3 6 Constrained by the questions raised by the case, the Court
could not define these categories of professionals for purposes of clarifying
the federal common-law privilege. Therefore, one of the challenges of
interpreting the privilege will be determining which psychotherapeutic
relationships are covered.
37
1. Medically Trained Therapists
Even if the Court committed itself to a psychotherapist-patient privilege
based on the blueprint of Proposed Rule 504, questions would arise
concerning the relationships encompassed by the privilege. The scope of the
psychotherapist-patient privilege is not self-evident, even in its core area of
application. Specifically, the term "psychiatrist' invites argument over
whether it encompasses only medical doctors with a certification in
psychiatry or a broader range of physicians. As noted above, Proposed Rule
504 used broad language. As drafted, the Proposed Rule purported to protect
communications with any medical doctor, provided that the doctor was
engaged in diagnosing or treating a mental or emotional condition. At some
point in their practices, most physicians address mental or emotional
conditions, thus falling within the scope of the Proposed Rule.
In Jaffee, however, the Court stated only that "a psychotherapist privilege
covers confidential communications made to licensed psychiatrists and
psychologists., 38 Because the question was not raised in Jaffee, it is unclear
whether the Court intended to restrict the privilege to only those medical
doctors licensed in psychiatry. That issue must be addressed in future cases.
The question of which physicians are included within the privilege has
been a topic of long debate. In 1952, one commentator argued that the
privilege should cover all medical doctors when they perform
psychotherapy.39 Critics of that position, however, contend that it accords too
much expertise to general practitioners who possess little or no training in
36. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 15.
37. This Article does not discuss the "reasonable belief' cases, where a patient mistakenly
believes that the therapist falls within a privileged category. See generally 25 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT
& KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTfCE AND PROCEDURE § 5527 (1989). Such cases raise
interesting questions concerning the complex relationship between state and federal law and how a
patient might arrive at a reasonable but mistaken belief affecting privilege.
38. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 15.
39. See Note, Confidential Communications to a Psychotherapist: A New Testimonial Privilege,
47 Nw. U. L. REv. 384 (1952).
(VOL. 76:1341
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psychotherapy. Moreover, courts would have the difficult task of separating
the aspects of the doctor's practice in which psychotherapy plays a role from
those aspects in which it does not40
State courts interpreting state privileges have tackled the question of
which aspects of medical practice fall within the psychotherapist-patient
privilege. Some have settled on a middle position. In Wiles v. Wiles,41 the
Supreme Court of Georgia considered whether a medical doctor who treated
patients for psychiatric problems fell within the statutory term "psychiatrist."
The state statute did not define the meaning of the term.42 The court
examined the interpretation of the term in other states, noting that some
statutes contained more specific language.43 The court interpreted
"psychiatrist" in the Georgia statute to mean "a person licensed to practice
medicine, or reasonably believed by the patient so to be, who devotes a
substantial portion of his or her time engaged in the diagnosis and treatment
of a mental or emotional condition, including alcohol or drug addiction.""
The Georgia approach strikes an appropriate balance. It recognizes that
the division between areas of specialized medical practice is not always clear
and that physicians often have expertise outside their certified areas of
practice.45 The federal privilege should likewise extend to communications to
a licensed medical doctor only if the communications occurred in the course
of psychotherapy and a substantial portion of the physician's practice is
devoted to treating psychiatric, mental, or emotional problems. A physician
specializing in those areas regularly calls on psychiatric training and is likely
competent to provide psychotherapy. In providing psychotherapy, the
physician must rely on an exchange of communications with the patient that
requires the protection of the privilege. This professional relationship
warrants the protection of the strong psychotherapist-patient privilege
established in Jaffee.
40. See generally Ralph Slovenko, Psychiaty and a Second Look at the Medical Privilege, 6
WAYNE L. REV. 175 (1960); CALIFORNIA L. REVISION COMM'N, TENTATIVE RECOMMENDATION AND
STUDY OF UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE, ART. V PRIVILEGES, A Privilege Not Covered by the
Uniform Rules-Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege, 416, 431 (1964) (explaining difficulty in
determining when privilege applies to physicians not specializing in psychotherapy and concluding
that denial of privilege to such physicians will not hinder their professional activities).
41. 448 S.E.2d 681 (Ga. 1994).
42. See id. at 682-83 (construing GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-21(5)).
43. See id. at 683 n.4.
44. Id at 684.
45. See id. at 683-84.
1998] 1351
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2. Social Workers
Proposed Rule 504 adopted a safe course when it extended the
psychotherapist-patient privilege only to medical doctors and licensed
psychologists.46 All fifty states license psychologists and require fairly
uniform credentials. When the Court extended the privilege to social workers
in Jaffee, it relegated to common-law development the assessment of a wide
range of counseling relationships to determine whether they warrant privilege
protection.
In Jaffee, the therapist was a counselor who had received a master's
degree in social work in 1969, had accumulated twelve thousand hours of
various types of psychotherapy and had helped supervise doctoral candidates
from "several psychology programs." 7 She was licensed under an Illinois
statute that required at least a master's degree, passage of a state
examination, and completion of three thousand hours of "supervised clinical
experience." 48 Nonetheless, upon review, the Court did not dwell on either
her specific qualifications or the Illinois requirements. Instead, the Court
cited the role of social workers in providing psychotherapy to less
advantaged segments of society and the states' consensus in "explicitly
extend[ing] a testimonial privilege to licensed social workers."''49 The Court
also noted the shift to more extensive regulation of the social work practice
since the promulgation of the proposed federal rules. 50 The majority therefore
held that the rationale for the privilege required protection for
communications made during psychotherapy with social workers as well as
with psychiatrists and psychologists. 51
As Justice Scalia pointed out in his dissent, however, the Court glossed
over the range of professional credentials and roles that qualify a social
worker for the state privilege. Professional requirements to obtain licensing
as a social worker vary from state to state.52 Many states license and extend
an evidentiary privilege to social workers who have little or no training
beyond a bachelor's degree in social work5 3 Because the federal government
46. The Advisory Committee noted, "The requirement that the psychologist be in fact licensed,
and not merely believed to be so, is believed to be justified by the number of persons, other than
psychiatrists, purporting to render psychotherapeutic aid and the variety of their theories." FED. R.
EVID. 504 advisory committee's note (proposed Nov. 20, 1972).
47. Jaffee v. Redmond, 51 F.3d 1346, 1350 n.3 (7th Cir. 1995).
48. Id. (construing 225 ILL. COM. STAT. ANN. 20/9 (West 1994)).
49. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1996).
50. See id. at 16 n.16.
51. See id. at 15-18.
52. See id. at 33-34 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
53. See 225 ILL. COMe. STAT. ANN. 20/9A (West Supp. 1998) (requiring social worker to have
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does not independently license counselors, the reach of the privilege must be
determined either by state licensing choices or by independent federal
common-law standards of professional training. The federal courts should
not tie the federal privilege to the state licensing or state privilege laws
because state licensing statutes vary tremendously. 54 Moreover, the structure
of state licensing schemes is driven by the states' interest in comprehensively
regulating the profession. That interest extends to the full range of those who
have social work training and not just to those whose training qualifies them
as professional therapists. Many state statutes provide different licenses or
minimum of undergraduate degree in social work from accredited school, three years supervised
professional experience and passage of state certification examination); IND. CODE ANN. § 25-23.6-5-1
(West Supp. 1998) (requiring for state certificate as social worker, minimum of bachelor's degree in
social work from accredited school and either two years supervised social work experience or master's
degree in social work and passage of state certification examination); IOWA CODE ANN. § 154C.3
(West 1997) (requiring minimum of bachelor's degree in social work from accredited school and
passage of state examination); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6306 (1992 & Supp. 1997) (requiring
baccalaureate degree in social work from recognized and approved undergraduate program and
passage of state exam to become licensed as "baccalaureate social worker"); MD. CODE ANN., HEATH
OCC. § 19-302 (1994 & Supp. 1997) (requiring for social work associate, baccalaureate degree from
accredited college or university in program accredited by Council of Social Work Education); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch 112, § 131 (West 1997) (requiring for license as social worker, either
baccalaureate degree in social work from accredited school, or baccalaureate degree from accredited
school and equivalent of two years experience in social work setting); MICH. COM. LAWS ANN.
§ 339.1605 (West 1992) (requiring, as condition for registration as social worker, baccalaureate degree
and two years of social work experience as deemed acceptable to the state board); MINN STAT. ANN.
§ 148B.21 (West 1998) (requiring, as condition for social worker, baccalareate degree from accredited
program of social work, passage of state examination, and two years supervised experience); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 75-53-13 (1997) (requiring for license as social worker, baccalaureate degree in social
work from accredited school and passage of state examination); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-1,319 (1997)
(requiring for certification as social worker, baccalaureate or master's degree from "approved
educational program" in social work); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 641.B.22 (Michie 1997) (requiring for
license in social work, "baccalaureate degree... in a related field, completion of 3000 hours of social
work, and passage of an examination"); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 61-31-3, 61-31-9 (Michie 1978)
(requiring for title of "baccalaureate social worker," bachelor's degree in accredited social work
program and passage of written examination); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4757.28 (West Supp. 1998)
(requiring for license as social worker, baccalaureate degree from accredited school in social work, or
closely-related program that is approved by state, and passage of state examination); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 36-26-15 (Michie 1997) (requiring for license as social worker, baccalaureate degree in social
work or equivalent program from accredited school, two years experience in social work capacity and
passage of state examination); TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 50.016 (West 1997) (recognizing
baccalaureate in social work from accredited school as minimum evidence of qualification for
licensing decision); W. VA. CODE § 30-30-5(d) (1998) (requiring for social worker license,
baccalaureate degree in social work from accredited program and passage of state examination, with
exemption from B.A. requirement if continually employed for four years under licensed social worker
and performed 36 hours of accredited social work study); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 457.08(1) (West 1998)
(requiring for license as social worker, bachelor's degree from accredited school and passage of state
exam); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 33-38-106(b) (Michie 1997) (requiring for certification as social worker,
baccalaureate degree in social work from accredited program school, passage of state examination and
designated clinical supervisor).
54. See supra note 53.
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designations depending on the extent of the professional's training or
experience. Because of this range of designations or licenses for social
workers, the state privilege statutes vary in the credentials required for the
protection of the social worker-client privilege and the extent of protection it
provides. 5
Therefore, rather than adhering to the lines drawn by the states, the
federal courts should exercise independent judgment when developing the
federal common-law standard to gauge psychotherapists. Courts must
determine whether the privilege applies only to therapists who have
substantial training, including significant postgraduate education in
therapeutic techniques, or whether the privilege should apply to social
workers and other therapists with no more than basic undergraduate training
who claim to provide therapeutic counseling.
Professional standards may assist courts in determining the scope of the
privilege. The Clinical Social Work Federation's ("CSWF's") Code ofEthics
exhorts social workers not to "encourage the unsupervised private practice of
social work by those who fail to meet accepted standards of training and
experience." CSWIF's Code ofEthics defines the accepted credentials as
a master's degree in social work from a school of social work
accredited by the Council on Social Work Education, or a doctoral
degree in social work, that included a sequence of clinically oriented
course work and supervised clinical field placement, plus at least 2
years or its part-time equivalent of post-master's or doctoral full-time
supervision in direct-service clinical experience in a clinical setting.
5 6
Accordingly, courts should apply the privilege only to communications
made during therapy guided by a professional who has the expertise to
provide such therapy; only in that setting do the confidences clearly serve the
goals of the privilege.
In determining the scope of the privilege, courts should not attempt to
make ad hoc assessments of the competence of individual therapists to
practice their trade. Not only would that task unduly burden courts, it would
also undermine the predictability of the application of the privilege. Instead,
courts should rely on accredited training programs to define the skill level of
therapists covered under the privilege. Therefore, to serve the goals of the
privilege, courts should adhere to the division recognized within the social
work profession between professionals with graduate degrees and advanced
55. See Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 33-34.
56. CLINICAL SOCIAL WORK FEDERATION, supra note 28, Principle 1II(f) n.1.
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training and others without such formal training.
3. Other Types of Counselors
In addition to determining who qualifies as a psychiatrist or psychologist
and which social workers fall within the privilege, the federal courts will be
asked to extend the privilege to other counseling relationships. Many state
statutes extend privilege protection to other types of counselors. Most likely,
the beneficiaries of these state privileges will seek similar protections in
federal court. Indeed, some federal courts already have encountered
arguments that the privilege recognized in Jaffee should apply to other
relationships, such as those involving counselors with comprehensive
training.
Some courts have rather casually extended the privilege to such
relationships. For example, in United States v. Lowe,5 7 the court concluded
that the federal privilege applied to communications with a rape crisis
counselor. The communications were protected under the state statute
although the counselors were neither licensed psychotherapists nor social
workers. With little discussion, the court held that the "policies expressed in
Jaffee" supported a federal privilege for the communications.58 Under the
state law scheme considered in Lowe, one could become a counselor after
only thirty-five hours of training.59 Although the ease with which the court
determined that a privilege existed may have resulted from the court's
determination that the client had waived the privilege, the court should have
addressed whether the particular counselors had an appropriate claim to
protected relationships. Similarly, in Greet v. Zagrocki,6 the court held that
the privilege applied to records from the police department's Employee
Assistance Program without any discussion by the court of the types of
counselors who provided the therapy. In fact, in Greet the counselors in the
program were peer counselors with no consistent level of training or claim to
therapeutic expertise.61
In contrast, in United States v. Schwensow,6 2 the court adopted a more
responsible approach and refused to extend the privilege to nonprofessionals.
In Schwensow, the defendant argued that the privilege protected his
57. 948 F. Supp. 97 (D. Mass. 1996).
58. Id. at 99 (noting, however, that client can waive privilege).
59. See id. at 99.
60. No. CIV.A.96-2300, 1996 WL 724933, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 16, 1996).
61. See Telephone Interview with Employee of Philadelphia Police Department's Employee
Assistant Program (August 1, 1997).
62. 942 F. Supp. 402,408 (E.D. Wis. 1996).
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statements to two hotline volunteers at an Alcoholics Anonymous office. The
court, however, disagreed and refused to extend the privilege. It reasoned that
the volunteers lacked the credentials to be counselors, the defendant did not
approach them for counseling, and the communications in question could not
be characterized as psychotherapy.63 The court remarked that when the
counselors encouraged the defendant to seek help, "theirs was support of a
general, human nature, as opposed to something akin to advice a counselor
would give to a patient."64
Even prior to Jaffee, courts sometimes grappled with the privilege status
of different relationships. In Ziemann v. Burlington County Bridge
Commission,6 5 the magistrate was asked to extend a federal common-law
privilege to communications to a marriage counselor. The court viewed the
privacy interests in the relationship as identical to those protected by the
psychotherapist-patient privilege.6 Therefore, although not willing to
independently recognize a marriage counselor privilege, the court held that
communications with licensed marriage counselors would fall within the
psychotherapist-patient privilege.67
Furthermore, the status of communications made to other types of
counselors deserves thoughtful evaluation. Given the strength of the
privilege's protection, courts should carefully distinguish between privileged
and unprivileged relationships, guided by the rationale underlying Jaffee. The
Jaffee Court concluded that therapeutic communications would be chilled if
not privileged. The Court also noted that the therapeutic process provided
sufficient benefit to both the client and society to warrant the loss in evidence
that a privilege would entail.68 In reaching those conclusions, the Jaffee Court
was influenced by a number of factors. Most importantly, patients greatly
benefit from psychotherapeutic counseling guided by a trained professional.
The Court also stressed both the desirability of equalizing protection along
economic lines and the importance of comity with state privilege law.
Similar considerations should guide the common-law development of the
privilege.
63. See id.at 407.
64. Id. The court also noted several other reasons for not applying the privilege: the defendant
did not perceive the counselors to be psychotherapists; the counselors had no role in diagnosing or
delivering treatment to defendant; and the defendant's communication to the counselors did not relate
to diagnosis or treatment. See id. at 407-08.
65. 155 F.R.D. 497 (D.NJ. 1994).
66. See id. at 506.
67. See id. (qualifying privilege by stating only confidential communications would be
protected).
68. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1996).
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First, and most importantly, Jaffee only contemplates a privilege for
psychotherapeutic counseling. Therefore, if the counselor lacks sufficient
training to provide psychotherapy, the privilege should not attach. By
assuming that counseling delivered by those with limited or no training is
equivalent to counseling delivered by professionals who have satisfied the
training requirements of their field, one undervalues the educational benefit
and theoretical foundation of the psychology and social work fields. In their
article advocating the extension of the federal privilege to battered women's
counselors, Michael Bressman and Fernando Laguarda argue that
"[c]ounselors may be psychiatrists or psychotherapists, social workers,
clergy, attorneys, or volunteers with significant life experience. ''69 Their
position, however, is too expansive. These groups should not be treated as
interchangeable. For example, it would be irresponsible to assume that an
attorney who is not offering legal advice, but rather is offering therapeutic
counseling to a battered woman, has the training and skills comparable to a
psychiatrist, psychologist, or master's level social worker. Likewise, courts
should not assume that such lay counseling provides a benefit to the client
and to society equivalent to that of professional counseling and sufficient to
justify imposing a global privilege. To extend the psychotherapist-patient
privilege to relationships in which the "professional" has such a limited claim
to expertise is inconsistent with the Court's emphasis on the value of
psychotherapy guided by a trained professional.
In arriving at its holding in Jaffee, the Court emphasized advances made
in the social work profession since the promulgation of the proposed Federal
Rules of Evidence.70 The Court noted that states have increased their
regulation of the profession and that an increasing number of states have
extended a statutory privilege to social work counseling.71 Courts should also
consider the extent and impact of self-regulation within the profession.
Unlike many of the counseling groups that have received state privilege
protection, psychiatrists, psychologists, and social workers have established
bodies that accredit schools to educate the members of the profession. They
have also adopted codes of conduct for members of the profession and
maintain active professional organizations. 72 The accreditation process
assures a consistent level of training in therapeutic methods, making it more
69. Bressman & Laguarda, supra note 15, at 342; see also Anna Y. Soo, Note, Broadening the
Scope of Counselor-Patient Privilege to Protect the Privacy of the Sexual Assault Survivor, 32 HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. 255, 266 (1995) (arguing that privilege should extend to sexual assault counselors
regardless of their lack of professional training).
70. See 518 U.S. at 15-17.
71. Seeid.atl6-17.
72. See DEAN L. HUMMEL ET AL., LAW AND ETHICS IN COUNSELING 46-48 (1985).
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likely that the professionals who graduate from these programs will advance
the individual and societal goals of psychotherapy.
7 3
Social workers have also joined psychiatrists and psychologists in
adopting a professional code with an obligation of confidentiality. 74 The
ethical codes influence the therapeutic setting, restricting the therapist from
revealing client confidences and thus imbuing the relationship with an
assurance of confidentiality. Moreover, if the law does not privilege the
client's communications and a court orders the therapist to reveal
conversations with the patient, the professional's legal and ethical obligations
may conflict. Thus, the therapist must choose between resisting a court order
to reveal and violating an ethical obligation not to reveal the
communications.75
By contrast, the nonprofessional counselors who have obtained statutory
privilege protection in a number of states typically possess far less training
and are not subject to codes of conduct. The common bond among the
nonprofessional counselors is merely the setting in which they counsel and a
modicum of training. They do not constitute cohesive quasi-professional
groups and consequently have not promulgated regulations to guide their
counseling practice. Therefore, their sensitivity to the need for
confidentiality, their ethical obligations, and their training to provide
beneficial therapy are all of a lower order than those of professional
therapists.
Second, the Jaffee Court sought to avoid distinctions that would privilege
the communications of those who could afford more expensive
psychotherapy, such as that with a psychiatrist or psychologist, while
providing no shield for the communications of those engaged in more
73. For example, the accreditation standards for social work programs (at both the bachelor's and
master's level) detail the subjects to be treated in the curriculum. See generally COMNSSION ON
ACCREDITATION, COUNCIL ON SOCIAL WORK EDUC., HANDBOOK OF ACCREDITATION STANDARDS
AND PROCEDURES (4th ed. 1994). One purpose of master's programs is to produce graduates "who can
analyze, intervene, and evaluate in ways that are highly differentiated, discriminating, and self-
critical." Id. at 137, § M5.7. The master's level curriculum must include "content on ... human
behavior and the social environment.., social work practice, and field practicum." Id. at 138, § M61.
It must further include "content about theories and knowledge of the human bio-psycho-social
development" and "an understanding of the interactions among human biological, social,
psychological, and cultural systems as they affect and are affected by human behavior," and students
"must be taught to evaluate theory and apply theory to client situations." Id. at 140-14 1, § M6.9.
74. See NATIONAL ASS'N SOCIAL WORKERS, supra note 28, Standard 2.02; CLINICAL SOCIAL
WORK FEDERATION, supra note 28, Principle III; AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSN'S PRINCIPLES, supra
note 26, § 4; ETHICAL PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGISTS, supra note 28, Standard 5.
75. See Amici Curiae Brief for the National Association of Social Workers, The Illinois Chapter
of the National Association of Social Workers, The National Federation of Societies for Clinical Social
Work, The Illinois Society for Clinical Social Work, and The American Board of Examiners in
Clinical Social Work at *3, Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996) (No. 95-266).
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affordable therapy with a social worker.76 Extrapolating from this aspect of
Jaffee, some argue that the privilege should extend to nonprofessional
counselors because they provide an important source of counseling to poor
clients." Courts should receive this argument with caution. The decision in
Jaffee that the privilege should protect communications with social workers
does not rest solely on the likelihood that less advantaged clients will be
counseled by social workers, but, as explored above, rests on the professional
training of the therapist. A strong privilege can be justified only if the
counseling promises to provide the therapeutic benefit on which the privilege
rests. If courts extend protection to a range of nonprofessional counselors,
they are likely to weaken the protection. Courts should not dilute the
privilege merely to accommodate the circumstances into which society
forces patients of limited means. By restricting the privilege to appropriate
counseling relationships, courts may encourage governments to provide
appropriately trained therapists where counseling is needed.
Third, the Jaffee Court expressed concern with comity, hoping to
maintain some balance between state and federal privilege. But Jaffee did not
signal an intention to allow the states to dictate the federal common law.
78
The development of a privilege through the common-law process greatly
differs from the statutory development of privileges that typifies state law.
Unlike a statutory privilege, courts cannot tailor federal psychotherapist-
patient privilege to reflect particular counseling contexts and the variation in
competence among those who provide counseling. It is a one-size-fits-all
privilege. Therefore, if the federal privilege is extended to a crisis counselor
with thirty-five hours of training or an abuse counselor whose training lies in
her own life experience, the communications to those counselors will receive
the same degree of protection as a patient's communications to a
psychologist or psychiatrist who guides a course of therapy over an extended
period of time. As the range of relationships covered by the privilege
expands, the challenge in defining appropriate protection increases as well.
The patchwork of state privilege and confidentiality statutes demonstrates
the difficulty of determining the appropriate reach of protection. For
example, the Pennsylvania legislature established absolute privileges for
communications to sexual assault counselors79 and to domestic abuse
counselors.80 In defining these two privileges, however, the legislature
76. See518 U.S. at 15-16.
77. See Bressman & Laguarda, supra note 15, at 342.
78. See generally Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 12-13.
79. See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5945.1 (West 1997).
80. See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6116 (West 1997).
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provided that the abuse counselor privilege terminates on the death of the
abuse victim,81 but the sexual assault counselor privilege does not. In contrast
to the privileges for communications with sexual assault counselors and
domestic abuse counselors, the Pennsylvania psychotherapist-patient
privilege82 is not absolute and does not apply in certain cases. 3 A federal
common-law privilege cannot accommodate these sorts of variations in state
law. Therefore, although the federal courts should consider state law in
determining the parameters of the federal privilege, the desire for comity
should not persuade courts that the federal privilege must shield all
counseling relationships protected under state law.
4. Supervised Personnel
Under certain circumstances, the protection of the psychotherapist-patient
privilege should extend to communications involving less trained personnel
when they are supervised by highly trained therapists. Certainly, the privilege
should extend to secretaries and such essential support personnel to whom
the client may communicate sensitive information as the client seeks
treatment.8 4 In addition, the privilege should attach when therapy is
conducted under supervision as part of a professional training program, but
not when a nonprofessional conducts the therapy. Just as the attorney-client
privilege shields communications to nonattorneys acting for the attorney, the
psychotherapist-patient privilege should shield communications to those
assisting the professionally trained psychotherapist.8 5 The Proposed Rule
provided that a communication would be confidential despite disclosure to
third persons "participating in the diagnosis and treatment under the direction
of the psychotherapist, including members of the patient's family."86 Most
states extend similar protection to communications to those appropriately
81. Seeid.
82. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5944 (West 1997).
83. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Embick, 506 A.2d 455 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (involving action to
terminate parental rights); see also, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(g) (West 1997) (providing
almost absolute privilege for nurses, psychologists, and social workers engaged in assessment or
treatment but directing court to apply privilege for sexual assault counselors subject to balancing test).
84. If the client communicates the information without seeking psychotherapeutic help, however,
the privilege should not apply. See, e.g., Cavin v. State, 855 S.W.2d 285, 288-89 (Ark. 1993)
(statements to licensed psychiatric technician nurse working as emergency operator at mental health
facility and to registered nurse at same facility were not privileged because patient not shown to be
seeking treatment and did not ask for help).
85. See 3 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE § 503.07(1)
(Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 1997); see also United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1337
(7th Cir. 1979) (extending privilege to investigator working for attorney).
86. FED. R. EVID. 504(a)(3) (proposed Nov. 20, 1972).
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involved in the therapy.8 7
Training in psychiatry, clinical psychology, and social work includes
practice experience supervised by professionals as an essential component of
the curriculum designed to teach psychotherapeutic techniques. There is no
reason to exclude such psychotherapy sessions from the privilege's coverage.
The goal of the communication, as well as the basic professional setting, is
not markedly different merely because a student is involved. In addition,
indigent clients may be more likely to receive therapy in settings where a
highly credentialed professional supervises therapists who are earning their
professional licenses. If the line is strictly drawn at licensed practitioners who
hold a postgraduate degree and the requisite hours of supervised training,
then the value of the privilege for the less fortunate might be diminished.88
In contrast, when therapy is provided by one whose professional
credentials do not independently warrant application of the privilege, the
party asserting the privilege should have the burden of demonstrating
sufficient supervision by a qualified professional so that the therapist can be
regarded as an extension of the professional. In the case of In re C.P.,89 the
Supreme Court of Indiana appropriately rejected the argument that
communications to a social worker fell under the physician-patient privilege
because the social worker was supervised by a psychiatrist and was therefore
"adjunct personnel" to the psychiatrist. The social worker consulted with the
patient, diagnosed the patient, and prepared the treatment plan. The
psychiatrist never saw the patient and only reviewed the plan in a brief
consultation with the social worker, thereafter consulting with the therapist
once or twice a year.9° Acknowledging that the privilege would extend to
those who assist physicians, the court concluded that the level of supervision
in that case was insufficient.91 The court quoted Judge Weinstein:
If, for example, the psychiatrist works closely with a social worker
87. See, e.g., Lovett v. Superior Court, 250 Cal. Rptr. 25, 28-29 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (holding
that participants in group therapy were present to further interests of treatment, and therefore privilege
was not waived); Cabrera v. Cabrera, 580 A.2d 1227, 1233-34 (Conn. App. Ct. 1990) (holding that
presence of family member at therapy session did not waive privilege).
88. See State v. Gotfrey, 598 P.2d 1325, 1329 (Utah 1979) (Stewart, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Justice Stewart criticized the majority for interpreting the psychologist-patient
privilege not to extend to an unlicenced psychologist acting under the supervision of a licensed
psychologist. He argued that its effect "is to make an invidious discrimination in the quality of
psychological services available to a person who can afford to consult a private practitioner and the
quality of service which lesser advantaged persons may receive when seeking the same services from a
government sponsored institution." Id. at 1329.
89. 563 N.E.2d 1275 (Ind. 1990).
90. See id. at 1275.
91. Seeid. at 1278-79.
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who takes part of a patient's history it should not matter whether the
psychotherapist is present since the patient should treat the social
worker with the same trust. Similarly, if a paraprofessional is working
under close supervision and control of a professional he should be
covered. In contrast paraprofessionals who are left virtually
unsupervised... are probably not considered by the patient as
psychotherapists and they should not be included in the privilege.92
The privilege should not apply, however, when the course of therapy is
carried out by a nonprofessional who is not conducting the therapy as part of
a supervised training program, whether or not the nonprofessional is
supervised by a professional. For example, in United States v. Lowe, even
though the state required that the rape crisis counselor be "under the direct
control and supervision of a licensed social worker, nurse, psychiatrist,
psychologist or psychotherapist," 93 the court should not have extended the
privilege to the untrained counselor.94 The nonprofessional lacks the
pedagogical foundation to give breadth and depth to the therapeutic process.
Counseling guided by a nonprofessional, like sexual assault counseling, is
likely focused on a single, narrow issue. This type of counseling does not
warrant the protection of the common-law privilege. Without professional
training, one cannot readily distinguish the interaction between the counselor
and the counselee from a conversation with a concerned friend or family
member. The tools available to the counselor functioning with such limited
training do not as a matter of law provide such a great individual and societal
benefit to warrant foreclosing access to the communications. Admittedly, the
legislature may decide to provide protection to relationships that provide
targeted counseling delivered by nonprofessionals if the legislature evaluates
the structure within which such counseling is provided and deems it worthy
of a privilege. But the legislature should not provide such protection under
the psychotherapist-patient privilege.
B. Types ofInformation
Questions concerning the scope of the psychotherapist-patient privilege
will inevitably arise. Proposed Rule 504 defined a privilege that attached to
"confidential communications, made for the purposes of diagnosis or
92. Id. at 1278 (emphasis omitted) (quoting 3 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER,
WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE § 504(5) (1989)).
93. 948 F. Supp. 97, 99 (D. Mass 1996).
94. Butseeid. at99.
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treatment of his mental or emotional condition."95 This definition describes
the core area of the privilege, agreed upon by all jurisdictions and is also at
the heart of Jaffee. The federal privilege is designed to foster and protect
confidential communications made in a psychotherapeutic relationship.
Although the privilege clearly shields communications made for
treatment, a question may arise whether the privilege extends to
communications made for purposes of diagnosis. The goals of the privilege
are best served by a predictable approach that protects communications made
for either diagnosis or treatment. Both the Proposed Rule and most state
statutes defining the privilege extend protection to statements made for
diagnosis as well as treatment The common-law privilege should similarly
protect communications even when the goal of the exchange is diagnosis
rather than treatment. In Williams v. Dist'ct of Columbia,96 the plaintiff sued
the city and police office in connection with the death of her son and sought
records of the police officer's sessions with a psychiatrist from the Police and
Fire Clinic. Despite its factual similarity to Jaffee, the plaintiff argued that
her case was distinguishable because the sessions did not represent treatment
but were for the nontreatment purpose of assessing whether the officer
should return to active duty; she contended the sessions were therefore not
privileged.97 The court determined that the privilege attached to nontreatment
counseling, concluding that the key question was whether the confidentiality
of the sessions was compromised by the counselor's required report to the
authorities." The court held that no confidentiality was waived by the police
officer because the psychiatrist did not release information other than a yes or
no recommendation for the officer to return to active duty.99
The Williams court assumed that the privilege shields diagnosis as well as
treatment. The court could have evaluated whether the nature of the sessions
with the psychiatrist called the purposes of the privilege into play even
though they did not entail true psychotherapy. Had the court explored
whether the freedom to communicate freely in a diagnostic session is
significant to the public and private interests underlying Jaffee, it likely
would have concluded that open communication enhances the accuracy of
the diagnosis. Moreover, the court would have concluded that the public and
private interest in an accurate assessment of the police officer's mental state
95. FED. R. EVID. 504(b) (proposed Nov. 20, 1972).
96. No. CIV.A.96-0200-LFO, 1997 WL 224921 (D.D.C. Apr. 25, 1997).
97. See id. at *2.
98. See id.
99. See id.
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warranted enforcing the protection of the privilege.100
If the therapist is engaged in some activity other than treatment or
diagnosis, the privilege should not apply. In Jaffee, Justice Scalia posited that
extending the privilege to social workers would burden courts with the
difficult task of distinguishing communications made in psychotherapy from
those made while the social worker was engaged in administration or
community organizing.101 Justice Scalia, however, overstated the problem.
Courts routinely decide whether a client approached a lawyer for legal advice
or for an unprivileged matter, such as business advice. 02 Further, the
distinction between therapeutic and nontherapeutic contacts, such as
counseling for assistance in housing problems or interaction within a
community group working on a particular project, seems far easier to make.
When a party invokes the privilege to shield information outside the core
area of diagnosis and treatment, the court must determine whether the
information was intended to be confidential and is so integral to the
therapeutic relationship that its disclosure would undermine the goals of the
privilege. In Siegfi'ed v. City of Easton,10 3 the court held that the privilege
did not shield a police officer's communications to a psychologist during the
course of a prejob interview. The court pointed out that the officer knew
when he met with the psychologist that the psychologist would report to the
department and, therefore, could not have expected confidentiality.10
Usually, information outside the relationship is unrelated to the purpose
of the privilege. For example, the privilege does not apply to a patient's
statement to a third party not acting for the psychotherapist. In Pfeifer v. State
Farm Insurance Co., l05 the defendant argued that the privilege applied to his
personal journal. Although the journal was kept at his psychiatrist's request,
100. One can argue that an officer who is aware that the session will culminate in a job-related
recommendation might not be fully candid and, therefore, that the privilege's goal of fostering open
communication would not be served. Such an ad hoe assessment of the role of the privilege in relation
to a particular therapist-patient interaction would produce unpredictable and possibly inconsistent
applications of the privilege. To avoid this undesirable effect, courts should look broadly at whether
the privilege should cover diagnosis and eschew ad hoe assessment of the privilege's impact in the
particular setting.
101. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 30 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
102. See 3 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 85, § 503.06(c). Although attorneys may give their
clients advice on a broad spectrum of topics, only the distribution of legal expertise is privileged. Thus,
courts facing assertions of the privilege must sort through lawyer-client communications and privilege
only those communications that are "predominantly legal" in nature. See id.; see also Super Tire Eng'g
v. Bandag Inc., 562 F. Supp. 439, 441-42 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (assessing discovery request, court granted
privilege to documents used to "gain or provide legal assistance" and allowed discovery of those
which were merely business-related communications from lawyer).
103. 146 F.R.D. 98, 101-02 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
104. Seeid.atl0l.
105. No. CIV.A.96-1895, 1997 WL 276085, at *1 (E.D. La. May 22, 1997).
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it was merely a vehicle of introspection not written as a means of
communication with his psychiatrist.10 6 Disclosure of the journal would not
expose confidential communications or compromise the therapeutic
relationship, and the court easily concluded that the privilege did not
apply. 10
7
1. Patient-Identifying Information
Courts have struggled over whether patient-identifying information falls
within the scope of the privilege. In some cases, the party seeking
information requests only the identity of the psychotherapist's patient,
possibly with some additional information, such as the dates or frequency of
the patient's appointments. When a request for disclosure does not involve
the details of communications to the psychotherapist, the information falls
outside the core area of the psychotherapist-patient privilege. Nevertheless,
given the chilling effect such disclosure may have on psychotherapy, courts
should extend some protection to this information.
In 1960, Professor Ralph Slovenko wrote that "a person in psychotherapy,
by and large, visits his psychiatrist with the same secrecy that a man goes to a
bawdy house."' 08 Although a few courts disagree with Professor Slovenko
and have argued that no stigma attaches to receiving psychotherapy, 0 9 there
is ample evidence to the contrary." 0 Therefore, patient-identifying
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. Slovenko, supra note 40, at 188 n.46.
109. See, e.g., Flora v. Hamilton, 81 F.R.D. 576, 579 (M.D.N.C. 1978) (finding no stigma attaches
to those receiving psychological treatment); Reid v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 49 F.R.D. 91, 93-
94 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (holding that revealing decedent's psychotherapy treatment would not tarnish his
memory because society finds no disgrace in mental illness).
110. See Wisconsin Psychiatric Serv. Ltd. v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 839, 845 (1981) (noting that
"some people still view psychiatric patients as somehow 'tainted' by their visits to appropriate medical
specialists'); Scull v. Superior Court, 254 Cal. Rptr. 24, 26, 29 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that
protection of patient identity is essential because society stigmatizes those seeking psychiatric
assistance and without the privilege, those in need will be discouraged from seeking it); McMaster v.
Iowa Bd. of Psychology Exam'rs, 509 N.W.2d 754, 758-59 (Iowa 1993) (holding that disclosure of
mental health records would violate patient's right to privacy under state constitution in part "because
in some circles a social stigma still attaches to anyone who merely seeks the help of [mental health]
professionals"); Frederick R.C. v. Helene C., 582 N.Y.S.2d 926, 928 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992) (protecting
identity of patient because "society tends to place a stigma upon mental disease"); Weisbeck v. Hess,
524 N.W.2d 363, 365 (S.D. 1994) (holding that if patient identity is not protected, invasion of patient
privacy is even greater due to "the stigma that society often attaches to mental illness" (citing Scull,
254 Cal. Rptr. at 26)); Ellen S. Soffin, Note, The Case for a Federal Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege
That Protects Patient Identity, 1985 DUKE L.J. 1217, 1227-29 (arguing for patient-identity privilege to
protect patients from "powerful social stigma ... associated with psychiatric treatmene' and noting
that such stigma can severely damage careers and reputations of public figures).
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information should be protected. As expressed in Jaffee, the goal of the
psychotherapist-patient privilege is to encourage interaction in therapy that
will benefit both the individual and society. If, however, the patient knows
that her mere participation in psychotherapy may be disclosed, she may
forego therapy altogether.' A strong privilege would extend to this
information.
The federal courts that applied the psychotherapist-patient privilege
before it was recognized by the Supreme Court took the position that the
privilege does not shield patient-identifying information. 112 In the case of In
re Zuniga,1 3 the Sixth Circuit established the now prevailing approach of the
federal courts. In Zuniga, the court considered whether the psychotherapist-
patient privilege existed and, if so, whether it shielded the identity of the
patients of two psychiatrists under investigation for insurance fraud. In
addition to the identity of the patients, the grand jury sought the dates of their
appointments and the length of each treatment session.' 14 The court held that
the privilege did not cover the information sought by the grand jury.
Although the court acknowledged the harm threatened by such disclosure, it
considered society's interest in the evidence to be paramount. 15
111. The possibility that the threat of disclosure may influence treatment decisions was previously
recognized by the Supreme Court. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 600 (1977) (holding New York's
drug-reporting statute constitutional despite threat of disclosure).
112. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 970 F.2d 48 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that even if court
recognized privilege, it would not apply to patient-identifying information requested to determine
psychiatrist's tax liability); United States v. Lowe, 948 F. Supp. 97, 101 (D. Mass. 1996) (holding date
of contact as well as length and mode of communication was not privileged); In re Doe, 97 F.R.D.
640, 645-46 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (ordering discovery of records indicating patient identity and other
nonprivileged information).
113. 714F.2d 632(6th Cir. 1983).
114. See id. at 640. The court stated as an alternate basis for its ruling that the patients had waived
the privilege to the information by providing the information to Blue Cross/Blue Shield. See id.
115. The court stated:
It may be true that some persons would be hesitant to engage the services of a psychiatrist if
confronted with the prospect that the mere fact of their treatment might become known. This
consideration is not insubstantial. However, as indicated, the interest of society in obtaining all
evidence relevant to the enforcement of its laws commands a high priority.
In weighing these competing interests, the Court is constrained to conclude that, under the
facts of this case, the balance tips in favor of disclosure.
Il
The Zuniga court may have been influenced by the context of the case. The grand jury
investigation targeted the psychiatrists, not the patient. Thus, Zuniga appears to be one of the cases in
which a possibly dishonest therapist seeks to employ the privilege to frustrate a government
investigation.
The majority of federal courts that have since considered the question have cited and followed
Zuniga. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 970 F.2d 48 (5th Cir. 1992) (declining to recognize
psychiatrist-patient privilege in tax case, and citing Zuniga for proposition that privilege would not
shelter patient identifying information sought by Internal Revenue Service); In re August, 1993
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In assessing the privileged status of patient-identifying information, the
federal courts analogize to the rules governing attorney-client privilege,
which, as a general rule, does not shield the identity of the attorney's
client" 6 In drawing analogies between the two rules, however, the federal
courts ignore the differences in the rationale for the rules and the reasons for
exceptions to the rules.
The rationale for the attorney-client privilege is that it fosters an open
flow of communication as the client seeks legal advice from the attorney.
17
Revealing the identity of the client does not normally disrupt the flow of
confidential communications between the attorney and the client or reveal
the content of those communications. Consulting a lawyer normally
generates no social stigma or other negative social impact for the client. All
the federal circuits, however, recognize the exceptional cases where the mere
act of identifying the client would harm the interests protected by the
privilege. In those cases, the courts protect the identity of the client."' For
instance, if the publication of a client's identity would disclose a confidential
motive for seeking legal advice, the privilege's function of encouraging frank
discourse with legal counsel is preserved only by requiring the protection of
identity. The purpose of the privilege is therefore served in some situations
by including identity within the scope of its coverage." 9
Regular Grand Jury (Clinic Subpoena), 854 F. Supp. 1375 (S.D. Ind. 1993) (citing Zuniga and holding
that harm threatened by disclosure of patient-identifying information did not warrant privilege
protection); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum Dated Jan. 30, 1986, 638 F. Supp. 794 (D. Me.
1986) (rejecting psychiatrist's claim of privilege and enforcing grand jury subpoena seeking patient-
identifying information in medicaid fraud investigation).
116. See 3 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 85, § 503.12(4)(a).
117. Seeid.§503.3.
118. See generally Soffin, supra note 110, at 1240-43 (describing exceptions to attorney-client
privilege). See, e.g., Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960). In Baird, several clients sought
legal advice over concerns that they may have underpaid taxes. To protect the clients in case of a
future audit, the attorney anonymously mailed a lump-sum check to the IRS. The privilege was then
successfully asserted against an IRS subpoena requesting that the attorney reveal his client's identities.
The court found that revealing the identities would reveal the contents of confidential attorney-client
conversations, namely, the motive for seeking legal advice and the nature of the legal dilemma. See id.
at 630. Denying this protection would construct a disincentive for consulting legal counsel in similar
situations.
119. See John R. Przypyszny, Survey Project, Asserting the Attorney-Client Privilege: Client
Identity, Fee Information, Whereabouts, and Documents, 3 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 113 (1989)
(examining situations where enforcing purpose of attorney-client privilege requires protection of client
identity); Stephen A. Saltzburg, Communications Falling Within the Attorney-Client Privilege, IOWA
L. REV. 811, 820-824 (1981) (same); see also United States v. Liebman, 742 F.2d 807, 810 (3d Cir.
1984) (holding client identity privileged because revealing identity "when combined with the
substance of the communication ... that is already known" would reveal "all there is to know about a
confidential [attorney-client] communication" and eviscerate privilege); NLRB v. Harvey, 349 F.2d
900, 904-05 (4th Cir. 1965) (holding that client identity is privileged when content of privileged
communication has already been revealed and identifying client would therefore completely disclose
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In contrast to seeking legal advice, seeking psychotherapy continues to
stigmatize the patient, despite persistent efforts to better educate the public on
the nature of mental and emotional illnesses. 120 When the Jaffee Court
established the psychotherapist-patient privilege, it sought to foster open
interaction in psychotherapy, 12 ' acknowledging that therapy provides a
significant benefit to society as well as to the individual patients. If revealing
a patient's identity discourages other prospective patients from seeking
psychotherapy, the goal of the privilege will be frustrated. Moreover, some
courts allow disclosure of information well beyond just the patient's identity.
For example, in the case of In re Doe,122 the court held that because "[t]he
function of a psychotherapist-patient privilege is to protect the intensely
personal communications individuals make in the course of therapy," the
privilege would not extend to files that contained "only general medical
histories, descriptions of the patients' sleep habits and problems and surveys
of various factors (e.g., 'stressful life circumstances') affecting the patients'
ability to sleep."1 3 Instead of allowing such broad disclosures, the federal
courts should construe the privilege to cover patient-identifying information
as well as the contents of communications within the therapeutic relationship.
A number of state courts recognize the chilling effect of disclosing even
the identity of a psychotherapist's patients and therefore interpret
"confidential communication" to include patient identity. In some cases,
courts appear to give absolute privilege protection to patient-identifying
information. In Weisbeck v. Hess,124 the plaintiff, an aggrieved husband, sued
his ex-wife's former therapist for breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and
seduction. The plaintiff sought the therapist's patient files to investigate
whether the therapist had engaged in similar relationships with other female
confidential attorney-client discussions); D'Alessio v. Gilberg, 617 N.Y.S.2d 484, 486 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1994) (holding that court could not compel attorney to reveal name of client who contacted him
regarding involvement in hit-and-run accident).
120. See Bruce J. Winnick, The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege: A Therapeutic Jurisprudential
View, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 249, 259 (1996) ("Although there have been many efforts to destigmatize
mental illness, sadly such stigma continues.").
121. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10 (1996) ("Effective psychotherapy... depends upon
an atmosphere of confidence and trust in which the patient is willing to make a frank and complete
disclosure of facts, emotions, memories, and fears.").
122. 97 F.R.D. 640 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
123. Id. at 645; see also Commonwealth v. Kobrin, 479 N.E.2d 674, 681 (Mass. 1985) (allowing
access to records "documenting the times and lengths of patient appointments, fees, patient diagnoses,
treatment plans and recommendations, and somatic therapies"); Richard G. Taranto, The Psychiatrist-
Patient Privilege and Third-Party Payers: Commonwealth v. Kobrin, 14 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 25
(1986).
124. 524 N.W.2d 363 (S.D. 1994).
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patients, but the South Dakota court refused disclosure. 125 Likewise, in Smith
v. Superior Court,12 6 the court refused to allow access to the names of the
psychologist-husband's patients in a divorce action. The court drew an
analogy to cases enforcing the physician-patient privilege to prevent
disclosure of patient identity when to do so would reveal the medical
problem for which the patient sought treatment. Addressing the mental health
context, the court remarked:
When a patient seeks out the counsel of a psychotherapist, he wants
privacy and sanctuary from the world and its pressures. The patient
desires in this place of safety an opportunity to be as open and candid
as possible to enable the psychotherapist the maximum opportunity to
help him with his problems. The patient's purpose would be inhibited
and frustrated if his psychotherapist could be compelled to give up his
identity without his consent. Public knowledge of treatment by a
psychotherapist reveals the existence and, in a general sense, the
nature of the malady.
127
Although the courts in Weisbeck and Smith may have been swayed by the
parties' ability to obtain the evidence they needed without access to the
allegedly privileged information, neither court expressly balanced the need
for the evidence against the role of the privilege. Both framed the protection
as absolute.
The better approach is to use a balancing test and, if warranted, order
disclosure of patient-identifying information. The majority of courts employ
a balancing test to determine whether to compel disclosure of patient-
identifying information.12 8 In cases applying Smith, the California courts
require disclosure of patient identity despite a claim of privilege if "the
government seeks to promote a compelling interest and ... there is no less
intrusive means of accomplishing its purpose."'129 For example, in the County
ofAlameda v. Superior Court,130 the court upheld a disclosure order because
the plaintiff could not otherwise acquire information critical to her suit
against the county. In the underlying suit, the plaintiff, a mental patient,
125. See id at 366. But see Molly E. Slaughter, Note, Misuse of the Psychotherapist-Patient
Privilege in Weisbeck v. Hess: A Step Backward in the Prohibition of Sexual Exploitation of a Patient
by a Psychotherapist, 41 S.D. L. REV. 574 (1996) (arguing that Supreme Court of South Dakota
"failed to account for the seriousness of the misconduct and overestimated the protection provided by
the psychotherapist-patient privilege").
126. 173 Cal. Rptr. 145 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
127. Id. at 148.
128. See, e.g., Wisconsin Psychiatric Serv. v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 839, 845-46 (1981).
129. Scull v. Superior Court, 254 Cal. Rptr. 24, 27 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
130. 239 Cal. Rptr. 400 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
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alleged that the county was liable because she was raped by a fellow patient
while in the county hospital. The county invoked the privilege to prevent
discovery of the identity of the male patient found with plaintiff at the time of
the alleged rape.131 The court concluded that the plaintiff could not
corroborate her allegations against the county without the information she
sought 32 Therefore, given the need for and importance of the evidence,
limited disclosure was appropriate. Similarly, in Hospital Corp. ofAmerica v.
Superior Court,133 the Arizona court required disclosure despite the privilege
because the juvenile defendant in a delinquency proceeding had no other
means of obtaining information critical to his defense. In Frederick R.C. v.
Helene C.,'3 4 the New York court decided against disclosure after applying a
balancing test to determine that the plaintiff in a divorce action had not
overcome the privilege interest of the patients of her husband's psychologist.
Given the evidence already available to the plaintiff, the court concluded that
"the injury that would result to the relation which the privilege seeks to foster
and protect would be greater than the benefit it would gain from the 'correct
disposition of the litigation."' 135 The court therefore refused to order
disclosure of information relating to the identity of the patients.' 36
A balancing test allows the court to determine whether disclosure would
cause the harm addressed by the privilege or whether the goals of the
privilege can be served without frustrating litigation fairness. Given the
competing interests in disclosure and privacy, courts often seek a middle
ground that serves both sets of interests. 13 7 Under a balancing approach, the
court can factor in the parties' intransigence and the availability of a solution
that provides the essential information with the least loss of privacy.
In addition, the court may determine that the interests protected by the
privilege are only marginally implicated in a given discovery request. For
example, some health care providers have advanced the privilege to block
plaintiffs' access to data concerning other patients who may have
experienced similar treatment.138 Under those circumstances, the court is
131. See id. at401.
132. Seeid. at403, 406.
133. 755 P.2d 1198, 1200-02 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988).
134. 582 N.Y.S.2d 926, 928-29 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992).
135. Id. at 929.
136. See id.
137. In Frederick R.C., the court noted that the parties had not offered any "alternative or
compromise" solution. Id. In Smith, the court reported that the trial court "urged the parties to work
between themselves and find a compromise that would both preserve the patients' anonymity and
secure for the wife more detailed information regarding petitioner's income." Smith v. Superior Court,
173 Cal. Rptr. 145, 146 (1981).
138. See, e.g., N.O. v. Callahan, 110 F.R.D. 637, 643.46 (D. Mass. 1986) (defendant mental
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likely to grant access to the information both because the data can be
provided with little loss of patient privacy by redacting the records and
because the court may be skeptical about the motive of the defendant who
asserted the privilege. " 9
Similarly, in some divorce cases, a psychotherapist-spouse has advanced
the privilege to defeat an effort to use patient information to determine
income.140 Again, the interest in advancing the privilege appears to be self-
protection by the psychotherapist rather than patient privacy. In such cases,
the balance tips in favor of discovery, and the court should attempt to provide
the necessary information without undermining the purpose of the privilege.
Similar issues arise in criminal investigations where the privilege has
been asserted to frustrate government efforts to investigate fraud or other
wrongdoing by mental health providers.141 Courts can best resolve these
cases by employing a balancing test rather than taking the absolute position
that the privilege does not apply to patient-identifying information. In these
cases, the balance of interest is likely to prompt courts to circumvent the
privilege. Courts reason that the patient is rarely involved in the dispute;
instead, the privilege is asserted by the alleged wrongdoer in an obvious
attempt to frustrate the litigation or investigation. Moreover, the government
has a strong countervailing interest in pursuing the investigation. Thus, in
Zuniga, rather than adopting an absolute position, the court should have
ordered production under a balancing approach because the information
health facility asserted evidentiary privileges relating to privacy and release of personal data to prevent
disclosure of nonparty patient records); Parkson v. Central DuPage Hosp., Inc., 435 N.E.2d 140, 141-
42 (11. Ct. App. 1982) (defendant hospital in medical malpractice case asserted privilege for nonparty
patients to prevent discovery of records of those treated with particular drug).
139. See Terre Haute Reg'l Hosp., Inc. v. Trueblood, 600 N.E.2d 1358, 1362 (Ind. 1992)
(allowing discovery of nonparty medical records in face of physician-patient privilege claim because
redaction of records provided adequate protection). But see Parkson, 435 N.E.2d 140. In Parkson, the
Illinois court enforced the state's physician-patient privilege to bar access to records of other patients
who had received the same medication that the plaintiffs alleged caused their injury. The court rejected
the plaintiffs' argument in support of the trial court's order allowing the hospital to strike patients'
names and identifying numbers from the records, expressing fear that the requested files would still
contain information that would identify the patient. See id. at 144. Parkson represents an overly strict
enforcement of the privilege, threatening the ends ofjustice while shielding information unnecessarily.
140. See Smith, 173 Cal. Rptr. 145; Frederick R.C., 582 N.Y.S.2d 926.
141. See United States v. Moore, 970 F.2d 48 (5th Cir. 1992) (asserting privilege in response to
IRS subpeoena requesting patient identity and amount each owed); In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632 (6th
Cir. 1983) (asserting privilege to prevent discovery of patient identity and appointment information in
insurance fraud investigation); In re August, 1993 Regular Grand Jury (Clinic Subpoena), 854 F.
Supp. 1375 (S.D. Ind. 1993) (asserting privilege during grand jury investigation of medical clinic's
billing practices); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum Dated Jan. 30, 1986, 638 F. Supp. 794
(D. Me. 1986) (asserting privilege in medicaid fraud investigation); In re Doe, 97 F.R.D. 640
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) (asserting privilege during government investigation of medical corporation
suspected of issuing illegal prescriptions).
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concerning patient appointments was critical to the determination of whether
the therapist submitted falsified bills. In re Doe142 illustrates a better
approach. In Doe, the court concluded that the patients' files were crucial to
the government's investigation of the psychiatrist's alleged drug selling and
ordered disclosure of the files with patient names redacted.1
43
Just as it should protect disclosure of the patient's identity, the privilege
should also shelter the information that an identified person is a
psychotherapy patient and is undergoing therapy or treatment for a particular
reason or illness. The rationale is identical. To disclose the fact of treatment
would stigmatize the patient. In City of Alhambra v. Superior Court,144 the
court refused to order disclosure of treatment information, concluding that
"to divulge the fact of psychiatric treatment" would "divulge more about the
nature of the condition for which he sought treatment" than was required
under the California Evidence Code. 145 Therefore, subject to the same
balancing test, the privilege should normally prevent discovery of whether a
party has received psychotherapy for a particular purpose.
146
2. Treatment Information Without Identifying Data
A variant of the problem of patient identity is the request for treatment
information divorced from identity. For example, if a plaintiff needs
information concerning those treated with the same medications, the
treatment information can be disclosed without associating it with the
patient's name. The treating professions have considered this problem over
time because of the professional need to share information with large groups
for educational purposes. Consequently, the ethical codes express the
professions' sense of a fair balance. If a professional disperses research
information, the ethical codes require the professional to adequately disguise
all patient-identifying information. 147 This compromise accommodates both
142. 97 F.R.D. 640 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
143. See id. at 643-44.
144. 168 Cal. Rptr. 49 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
145. Id. at 52.
146. But see infra text accompanying notes 160-87 (discussing circumstances in which patient's
posture in litigation results in waiver of privilege).
147. The American Psychiatric Association's Principles of Medical Ethics with Annotations
Especially Applicable to Psychiatry states, "Clinical and other materials used in teaching and writing
must be adequately disguised in order to preserve the anonymity of the individuals involved." See
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N PRINCIPLES, supra note 26, § 4. Similarly, the American
Psychological Association's Ethical Principles of Psychologists states, "Psychologists do not disclose
in their writings, lectures, or other public media, confidential, personally identifiable information
concerning their patients ... unless the person ... has consented in writing or unless there is other
ethical or legal authorization for doing so." See ETHICAL PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGISTS, supra note
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the professional need for research data and patient concerns regarding
privacy. Analyzing this problem in Lora v. Board of Education,148 Judge
Weinstein concluded that the plaintiffs could get anonymous records of
school students through discovery in their suit against the Board of
Education. Judge Weinstein noted the medical profession's practice of
sharing case histories in a manner designed to maintain patient
confidentiality but permit sharing of educational data.149 He suggested a
number of precautions to protect the patient's interest:
In addition to requiring that all identifying data be redacted and the
files coded, the court may order that the information they contain be
used solely for the purpose of the pending litigation; strict
confidentiality may be enforced under penalty of contempt; the
number of copies to be made of the documents may be rigidly
regulated, files submitted to the court may be ordered sealed; and all
material may be required to be returned to the defendants immediately
upon conclusion of this suit.
150
Courts should be able to enforce such requests of information separated from
the patient's identity, requiring that the records be redacted to protect the
identity of the patient.'
5
'
IV. EXCEPTIONS
In Jaffee, the Court declined to define the parameters of the newly
recognized privilege or address any of the possible exceptions to the
protection. 15  Proposed Rule 504 provided three exceptions to the
psychotherapist-patient privilege: in proceedings for hospitalization, in
28, Standard 5.08(a).
148. 74 F.R.D. 565 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
149. Seeid. at569.
150. See id. at 582-83; see also Wei v. Bodner, 127 F.R.D. 91, 97-98 (D.N.J. 1989) (applying
Lora's approach to records allegedly shielded by physician-patient privilege and ordering disclosure of
redacted records); N.O. v. Callahan, 110 F.R.D. 637, 646-47 (D. Mass. 1986) (applying approach
outlined in Lora to medical records privileged under state law and ordering disclosure of redacted
records); In re Doe, 97 F.R.D. 640, 645 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (ordering disclosure of redacted records);
State ex rel. Lester E. Cox Med. Ctr. v. Keet, 678 S.W.2d 813, 815 (Mo. 1984) (ordering disclosure of
redacted records).
151. For example, in State v. McGriff, 672 N.E.2d 1074, 1075-76 (Ohio Ct App. 1996), the court,
applying the state's physician-patient privilege, permitted disclosure of patient records in prosecuting a
doctor but required that the patients' names and addresses be redacted.
152. See 518 U.S. 1 (1996). The Court remarked, "it is neither necessary nor feasible to delineate
its full contours in a way that would 'govern all conceivable future questions in this area."' Id. at 18
(citing Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 386 (1981)).
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examinations conducted pursuant to court order, and in litigation if the
patient's mental condition is an element of the patient's claim or defense.
1 53
Courts will likely recognize these three exceptions as part of the federal
common law. The most troublesome exception to apply, the patient-litigant
exception, is discussed below.
Litigants may advocate recognition of yet other exceptions. Although the
Court explicitly rejected the balancing test under which the privilege would
give way when outweighed by greater public interests, there are likely
circumstances under Jaffee in which courts must balance interests to
determine the extent of protection derived from the privilege. Specifically,
courts may turn to a balancing test to define the exceptions to the privilege.
Prior to Jaffee, some courts used a balancing test to determine whether to
recognize an exception to the privilege. For example, in United States v.
Burtrum, 5 4 the defendant asked the court to recognize the psychotherapist-
patient privilege and exclude testimony by his psychotherapist. The court
refused to recognize a privilege in criminal child sexual abuse cases,
reasoning that the interests weighing on the side of access to information in
such cases compelled the admission of the evidence.1
55
The specific position taken in Burtrum is inconsistent with the strong
psychotherapist-patient privilege established in Jaffee. Burtrum represents an
unfortunate decision to set aside the privilege because the court viewed the
prosecution for sexual abuse of children as so significant that it would not
enforce the privilege and make the attendant evidentiary sacrifice. That
decision is risky. Courts can easily sacrifice privilege protection when the
stakes are high, but to do so overlooks the societal benefit of granting abusers
or other offenders protected access to psychotherapy. Nevertheless, Burtrum
illustrates the use of balancing to determine an exception to the privilege.
Similarly, in United States v. Hansen,'5 6 the court applied a balancing test
despite Jaffee's rejection of balancing. In Hansen, the court concluded that
the defendant's need for evidence outweighed the benefit of the privilege.
157
The patient was dead and the defendant, charged with his murder, claimed
self-defense.158 The court concluded that the victim's "mental and emotional
condition" was "central" to the defense and the interest in shielding the
information was slight because the victim was deceased.159
153. See FED. R. EVD. 504(d)(3) (proposed Nov. 20, 1972).
154. 17 F.3d 1299 (10th Cir. 1994).
155. See id. at 1302.
156. 955 F. Supp. 1225 (D. Mont. 1997).
157. See id. at 1226.
158. See id. at 1225-26.
159. Id. at 1226. The court also noted that its resolution of the issue was "consistent with the
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This Article does not address the range of exceptions and situations that
may prompt courts to balance the purposes of the psychotherapist-patient
privilege against other interests. Instead, this Article examines only the
contours of the patient-litigant exception.
A. Patient-Litigant Exception
The patient-litigant exception included in Proposed Rule 504 represents
the prevailing rule in the states' 60 and has been recognized as part of the
federal common-law psychotherapist-patient privilege.16' The consensus is
that "[t]o allow a [party] to hide ... behind a claim of privilege when that
approach taken by the states, most of which allow for disclosure of privileged information under the
facts presented here." Id.
Questions of posthumous application of privilege raise difficult questions. See, e.g., In re Sealed
Case, 124 F.3d 230 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (declining to enforce attorney-client privilege after death of
client), rev'd, 118 S. Ct 208 (1998) (holding attorney-client privilege extends beyond death); In re
Subpoena No. 22, 709 A.2d 385 (Pa. Super. Ct 1998) (holding that statutory psychotherapist-patient
privilege was overcome by need for information concerning patient's murder). These questions are
beyond the scope of this Article.
Hansen should not be read as signaling that criminal defendants can readily circumvent the
psychotherapist-patient privilege. Criminal defendants have tried various avenues to gain access to
privileged information. See generally Alfred Hill, Testimonial Privilege and Fair Trial, 80 COLUM. L.
REV. 1173 (1980); Peter Westen, Reflections on Alfred Hill's "Testimonial Privilege and Fair Trial,"
14 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 371 (1981); Robert Weisberg, Note, Defendant v. Witness: Measuring
Confrontation and Compulsory Process Rights Against Statutory Communications Privilege, 30 STAN.
L. REV. 935 (1978). In United States v. Haworth, 168 F.R.D. 660 (D.N.M. 1996), the defendants
argued that the confrontation clause overcame the psychotherapist-patient privilege and that they were
therefore constitutionally entitled to discover the records of a government witness's psychotherapist.
The court easily rejected the argument, citing precedent establishing that while the right to
confrontation may permit the defendant to employ information on cross-examination, it does not
translate into a discovery right. See id. at 661-62.
160. The patient-litigant exception withstood constitutional challenge in Caesar v. Mountanos,
542 F.2d 1064, 1067-68, 1070 (9th Cir. 1976), and In re Lifschutz, 467 P.2d 557 (Cal. 1970).
161. See, e.g., Rankin v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. 94-1850, 1995 WL 131390 (1st Cir. Mar. 27,
1995) (holding that plaintiff placed her mental state in issue when she alleged permanent
psychological disability and named her therapist as potential expert witness); Vasconcellos v. Cybex
Int'l., Inc., 962 F. Supp. 701, 708-09 (D. Md. 1997) (holding that sexual harassment claim seeking
recovery for severe emotional distress and intentional infliction of emotional distress placed plaintiff's
mental state in issue, therefore permitting discovery of psychiatric records, but quashing subpoena that
was too broad); Sarko v. Penn-Del Directory Co., 170 F.R.D. 127, 130-31 (E.D. Pa. 1997)
(recognizing patient-litigant exception, and holding that plaintiff placed her mental state at issue by
filing ADA claim against her former employer for failing to accommodate her mental disability);
Arzola v. Reigosa, 534 So. 2d 883 (Fla. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that under Florida law plaintiff fell
within patient-litigant exception because he sought damages for postaccident mental anguish);
Doolittle v. Ruffo, No. 88-CV- 1175, 1997 WL 151799, at *2-*3 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 1997) (finding
that plaintiff waived privilege by claiming severe emotional distress and placing her mental state in
issue); B. Joseph Wadsworth, Case Note, Evidence-Recognition of a Federal Psychotherapist-Patient
Privilege: Jaffee v. Remond, 32 LAND & WATER L. REV. 873 (1997) (advocating exceptions to federal
psychotherapist-patient privilege).
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condition is placed directly at issue in a case would simply be contrary to the
most basic sense of fairness and justice.'' 162 Consequently, if the patient
places her mental state sufficiently in issue by raising a claim or defense that
rests on proof of the mental state, the patient-litigant exception provides the
adverse party with access to the otherwise privileged information.
The exception must be construed cautiously. If applied overbroadly to
psychotherapeutic communications, the exception may discourage parties
who have undergone therapy from seeking any emotional or mental damages
for fear of exposing their entire therapeutic file to the opposing party.163
Therefore, courts must carefully determine when the patient's mental or
emotional condition is raised in a way that justifies opening the party's
mental health records to scrutiny from the opposing party.
Courts face three major issues in determining the scope of this exception:
(1) which claims and defenses place the mental state in issue sufficiently to
fall within the exception; (2) whether the exception extends to cases in which
the other party raises a claim or defense that puts the patient's mental state in
issue; and (3) whether the patient-litigant exception represents a total waiver
of the privilege or whether the breadth of the waiver should be restricted.
1. Claims Falling Within the Exception
Some allegations clearly place the pleading party's mental and emotional
state in issue in a way that waives the privilege. For example, in Butler v.
Burroughs Wellcome, Inc.,164 the plaintiff alleged a violation of her rights
under the American with Disabilities Act, claiming that her employer had
failed to reasonably accommodate her psychiatric disorder. The court granted
the defendant's discovery request, reasoning that the defendant required
access to the plaintiff's mental health records to determine whether she "was
generally foreclosed from similar employment," what would represent a
reasonable accommodation to her condition, and whether her difficulties
162. Premack v. J.CJ. Ogar, Inc., 148 F.R.D. 140, 145 (E.D. Pa. 1993). But see Vanderbilt v.
Town of Chilmark, 174 F.R.D. 225, 229-30 (D. Mass. 1997) (adopting narrow view of the exception,
and concluding that it applies only when patient uses privileged communication as sword, relying on it
to establish her claim).
163. See Lifschutz, 467 P.2d at 570; Davis v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 331, 335 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1992) (stating that "the scope of such waiver must be narrowly, rather than expansively
construed, so that plaintiffs will not be unduly deterred from instituting lawsuits by fear of exposure of
private activities"). One can also argue that if the exception is based on the pleadings rather than on
actual reliance on communications to the psychotherapist, the privilege's protection will be so
uncertain that its effectiveness will be undermined.
164. 920 F. Supp. 90 (E.D.N.C. 1996).
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flowed from her psychiatric condition.165 By placing her mental condition at
the heart of the case, the plaintiff waived her privilege. 166 Similarly, a
plaintiff waives her psychotherapist-patient privilege if she claims damages
for embarrassment, mental distress, and suffering as a result of sexual
harassment and introduces evidence that she suffers permanent psychiatric
disability caused by problems in the workplace and by other factors. 67
In other cases, the application of the exception is less clear. The federal
courts have not articulated a test to determine when the patient-litigant
exception applies. Further, they are split over what damage allegations
sufficiently place mental state in issue in order to fall within the patient-
litigant exception. 68 Some courts apply the exception broadly. For example,
in Dixon v. City of Lawton,169 an administratrix sued the city and several
police officers, claiming that they violated the civil rights of her deceased son
when they fatally shot him. The trial court permitted the defendants to
introduce records from a mental health center reflecting a visit from the
decedent one month before the fatal incident.170 Without deciding whether to
recognize the psychotherapist-patient privilege, the court concluded that the
decedent's mental health records were properly admitted under the patient-
litigant exception. 171 The court held that by seeking damages for "mental
165. See id. at 92; see also Patterson v. Chicago Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc., No. 96C4713,
1997 WL 323575 (N.D. Ill. June 6, 1997) (plaintiff alleging mental disability under ADA waived
privilege); Sarko v. Penn-Del Directory Co., 170 F.R.D. 127 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (plaintiff suing under
ADA alleged employer failed to make reasonable accommodations for her clinical depression and,
therefore, waived psychotherapist-patient privilege).
166. See Butler, 920 F. Supp. at 92. The court's language in Butler was overly broad, stating that
ADA plaintiffs "waive all privileges and privacy interests related to their claim by virtue of filing the
complaint." Id. Although the facts of the case warranted the waiver, courts should evaluate each ADA
claim with care and should not normally grant blanket access to records. Rather, courts should exercise
control to ensure that the plaintiff is not subjected to invasion of privacy beyond that warranted by the
particulars of the case.
167. See Ziemann v. Burlington County Bridge Comm'n, 155 F.R.D. 497 (D.NJ. 1994); see also
Rankin v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. 94-1850, 1995 WL 131390 (1st Cir. Mar. 27, 1995) (plaintiff
waived privilege by alleging that Title VII racial harassment and other violations resulted in permanent
psychological disability); Vann v. Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon, Inc., 967 F. Supp. 346 (C.D. Ill.
1997) (plaintiff waived privilege by placing her mental state in issue and naming her psychotherapist
as expert to be called as witness in case); Doolittle v. Ruffo, No. 88-CV-1175, 1997 WL 151799
(N.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 1997) (plaintiff placed her mental state in issue by alleging that defendants caused
severe emotional distress and debilitating depression that required doctor's care); Topol v. Trustees of
Univ. of Pa., 160 F.RtD. 476 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (sexual harassment plaintiff placed mental state in issue
by alleging that relationship had made her "depressed, anxious, and fearful" and seeking damages for
mental and emotional suffering).
168. See generally EEOC v. Danka Indus., Inc., 990 F. Supp. 1138, 1142 (E.D. Mo. 1997)
(discussing different views of when exception applies).
169. 898 F.2d 1443 (10th Cir. 1990).
170. See id. at 1450.
171. Seeid.
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pain and suffering of the decedent prior to his death," the plaintiff put the
decedent's mental health in issue at least to the extent that it warranted
revealing his one-day admission to the facility and his communications that
were pertinent to the issues before the court.172
Dixon applied the exception too broadly. A general allegation of mental
pain and suffering prior to death should not forfeit the protection of the
privilege and permit intrusion into mental health records. The general
allegation does not implicate the issue of mental health sufficiently to warrant
invading the protected area.
Price v. County of San Diego'73 also construed the exception broadly and
held that the plaintiff had waived the privilege by seeking damages for loss
of consortium. In Price, the plaintiff sued for damages occasioned by the
death of her husband as a result of hogtying by the police. The plaintiff
argued that she had not placed her mental state in issue merely by pleading
loss of consortium, reasoning that she had not claimed damages for
"extraordinary emotional distress or psychological damages."' 74 The court
relied both on the patient-litigant exception and on a balancing test under
which the privilege was deemed waived if "the relevance outweigh[ed] the
privacy interest.' 75 The court viewed loss of consortium as placing in issue
the "mental or emotional state of the relationship (i.e. the state of affection or
dislike, happiness or unhappiness).' 76 Like Dixon, Price places too great a
burden on privacy as the price of pursuing a claim for loss of consortium.
When a loss of consortium claim seeks recovery for deprivation of a tangible
component of the relationship, such as loss of services, probing the mental
state of the plaintiff is unnecessary for effective disposition of the action. 177
Claiming loss of consortium should not automatically effectuate a broad
172. Id. at 1450-51; see also Gould v. Durkin, No. CIV.A.96-CV-6249, 1997 WL 256950 (E.D.
Pa. May 15, 1997); Wimberly Resorts Property, Inc. v. Pfeuffer, 691 S.W.2d 27 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985)
(holding that under Texas law allegation of emotional trauma brought case within exception).
173. 165 F.R.D. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1996).
174. Id. at 622.
175. Id.
176. Id. In addition, the court was swayed by the allegation that several denials by the plaintiff
during her deposition were contradicted by communications reflected in her psychological records. See
id. at 622. The magistrate had conducted an in camera review of the documents and determined that
they were "certainly relevant." Id. at 623.
177. Loss of consortium focuses on the effect of an injury on a relationship, and not on the
anguish which it personally may bring. See Newan v. Exxon Corp., 722 F. Supp. 1146, 1149 (D. Del.
1989) (stressing that loss of consortium and infliction of emotional distress are distinct claims). The
claim may place mental state at issue, depending on which portion of the relationship was spoiled due
to the injury. When a plaintiff seeks recompense for intangibles such as loss of comfort, aid, solace, or
support, the mental state of the plaintiff and the spouse may become relevant. When compensation is
sought for loss of tangible services such as housework or repairs, no mental inquiry is necessary. See
Millington v. Southeastern Elevator Co., 239 N.E.2d 897, 901 (N.Y. 1968).
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waiver of the privilege and release of the plaintiff's mental health records.
Instead, courts should specifically examine the nature of the allegations and
determine waivers accordingly.
The exception recognized in Proposed Rule 504 operated only when the
patient relied upon a mental or emotional condition as an element of a claim
or defense and did not call for such a broad construction. In RK v.
Ramirez,178 the Supreme Court of Texas considered similar language and
concluded that the standard for the exception should not be mere relevance.
The court held that the exception would apply under Texas law when the
condition "relates in a significant way" to the claim or defense. 179 The court
suggested that the appropriate question is normally whether the jury "must
make a factual determination concerning the condition itself.' 80 This
limitation appropriately restricts the exception to those cases in which the
mental health information is sufficiently central to the case to require
disclosure of confidential information.
Other courts have also resisted a broad construction of the exception. For
example, in Roberts v. Superior Court,'8 ' the court rejected arguments that
the plaintiff's mental condition was in issue because she alleged that the
defendant's negligence rendered her "sick, sore, lame and disabled." The
court remarked:
We must of course recognize that any physical injury is likely to have
a "mental component" in the form of the pain suffered by the injured
person, at least insofar as he is conscious of the physical injury.
Presumably, the perception of pain from a particular injury will vary
among individuals. Thus, in every lawsuit involving personal injuries,
a mental component may be said to be at issue, in that limited sense at
least. However, to allow discovery of past psychiatric treatment
merely to ascertain whether the patient's past condition may have
decreased his tolerance to pain or whether the patient may have
discussed with his psychotherapist complaints similar to those to be
litigated, would defeat the purpose of the privilege .... 182
In Midkiff v. Shaver,'83 the court noted that a party does not put her
mental condition at issue by seeking recovery of ordinary mental anguish,
178. 887 S.W.2d 836 (Tex. 1994).
179. Id. at 842-43.
180. Id. at 843.
181. 508 P.2d 309 (Cal. 1973).
182. Id. at314.
183. 788 S.W.2d 399 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990).
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which it defined as "the emotional distress that typically accompanies the
tortious act."' 84
Similarly, some courts considering claims like loss of consortium have
not regarded such claims as bringing the case within the patient-litigant
exception. For example, in Thiele v. Ort'z,185 the Illinois court rejected the
argument that the plaintiffs' claim for loss of their son's society under the
Wrongful Death Act placed their son's mental state in issue. The defendant
argued that because the plaintiffs introduced testimony on "companionship,
love and affection," he was therefore entitled to introduce evidence of
psychological evaluations that the plaintiffs' son received several years
before his death at eighteen years of age.186 The court emphasized both the
importance of confidentiality and the consequent care required in applying
the exception and concluded that only a claim or defense that specifically
makes mental well-being an issue would fall within the exception. 1 7
2. Allegations by the Adverse Party
The court should not normally apply the exception to the privilege merely
because the opposing party advances allegations that make the patient's
mental state relevant. 188 The exception rests not only on notions of fairness
but also on concepts of waiver. The patient who places her mental state in
issue is deemed to have waived the protection of the privilege. An opposing
party, however, cannot waive the privilege for the patient. Therefore, courts
should exercise caution when applying the patient-litigant exception unless
the patient places the issue in litigation. For example, in a custody case, the
184. Id at 402; see also Davis v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 331, 335-36 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992)
(holding that plaintiff does not waive privilege by seeking damages for pain and suffering); Wilson v.
Bonner, 303 S.E.2d 134, 142 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that plaintiff did not put emotional
condition in issue by pleading emotional distress in malicious prosecution suit); D.C. v. S.A., 687
N.E.2d 1032, 1041 (Ill. 1997) (holding that plaintiff does not place mental state in issue by suing for
negligence); Webb v. Quincy City Lines, Inc., 219 N.E.2d 167 (111. App. Ct. 1966) (holding that claim
for pain and suffering did not place plaintiff's mental condition in issue and waive statutory privilege
shielding her psychiatric records); Gaynier v. Johnson, 673 S.W.2d 899, 906 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984)
(holding plaintiff did not place mental condition in issue by pleading fraud and trickery).
185. 520 N.E.2d 881 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988); see also Lewkow v. Gracie Square Hosp., 452 N.Y.S.2d
290 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982) (holding that loss of services claim did not place emotional condition in
issue), afd, 506 N.Y.S.2d 242 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986).
186. Thiele, 520 N.E.2d at 887.
187. See id. at 888.
188. See In re Matthew R., 688 A.2d 955 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997) (holding that mother's denial
of state's allegation of mental or emotional unfitness did not place case within patient-litigant
exception); see also Chung v. Legacy Corp., 548 N.W.2d 147, 150 (Iowa 1996) (patient-litigant
exception to physician-patient privilege applies only if condition is element of claim or defense of
party claiming privilege).
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court should not compel disclosure of privileged records merely because the
nonpatient spouse alleges a mental condition that bears on the fitness of the
patient spouse to have custody.'8 9
Some jurisdictions adopt a broader exception. For example, in Texas, the
exception applies "in any proceeding in which any party relies upon the
[physical, mental or emotional] condition as part of the party's claim or
defense."' 19 This approach allows the adverse party to bring the case within
the patient-litigant exception and thereby gain access to privileged mental
health information. To give the adverse party control of the privilege in this
manner undervalues it. Unless control is vested in the patient, the privilege's
protection will be illusory.
The federal courts should adopt the more restrictive version of the patient-
litigant exception as reflected in Proposed Rule 504, which generally applies
the exception only if the patient puts her own mental state in issue. This
position reflects the grounding of the exception in waiver theory and accords
control to the patient during the patient's lifetime.
When a patient's mental state is in controversy, but the patient has done
nothing to waive the privilege, the adverse party should have access to the
necessary evidence without breaching the privilege. To address the discovery
and proof problems the privilege poses for the adverse party, courts may
order the patient to undergo a mental examination for litigation purposes,
similar to the procedure provided by Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.'9' In Price, the court asserted that disclosure of psychological
189. See, e.g., Simek v. Superior Court, 172 Cal. Rptr. 564,569 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that
husband's request for visitation rights did not place his mental state in issue); Peisach v. Antuna, 539
So. 2d 544, 546 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (stating that "allegations that the custodial parent is
mentally unstable are not sufficient to place the custodial parent's mental health at issue and overcome
the privilege"); Griggs v. Griggs, 707 S.W.2d 488, 490-91 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that husband
did not waive privilege when he sought custody of his children when statute permitted mental state to
be condition considered in awarding custody, or by alleging wife was unstable). But see Schouw v.
Schouw, 593 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (refusing to order disclosure of husband's records,
but suggesting that disclosure might be appropriate if wife had substantiated her allegations of
psychological unfitness and that husband's present condition would affect his ability to take care of his
children).
190. TEx. R. Civ. EviD. 510(d)(5); see PLK. v. Ramirez, 887 S.W.2d 836 (Tex. 1994) (discussing
expanded Texas exception); Batson v. Rainey, 762 S.W.2d 717, 720 (rex. Ct. App. 1988) (applying
Texas rule and concluding that exception applied because employer alleged employee was terminated
because of history of drug and alcohol dependence).
191. Rule 35 provides in pertinent part:
When the mental or physical condition ... of a party or of a person in the custody or under the
legal control of a party... is in controversy, the court in which the action is pending may order the
party to submit to a physical or mental examination by a suitably licensed or certified examiner or
to produce for examination the person in the party's custody or legal control. The order may be
made only on motion for good cause shown and upon notice to the person to be examined and to
all parties ....
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records is "exceedingly less burdensome than a Rule 35(a) examination." 192
A patient who concludes that the examination is more burdensome than
disclosure of privileged information can waive the protection of the
psychotherapist-patient privilege and thereby avoid the examination. Others,
however, may prefer the court-ordered examination.
Although a Rule 35 order imposes an immediate burden of examination,
it may represent less intrusion into the privacy interests shielded by the
privilege. A court-ordered examination, in which the party undergoing
evaluation understands that the communications are not confidential and that
the examination has a targeted purpose related to the litigation, does not
threaten the public and private interests of the psychotherapist-patient
privilege, as recognized in Jaffee as the foundation of the psychotherapist-
patient privilege. Communications during court-ordered examinations are
routinely excepted from the privilege's protection.193 The exchange in such
an examination stands in contrast to ordinary psychotherapy, which is
influenced by the shield of confidentiality and generates communications and
records reflecting the unguarded candor fostered by that shield. Therefore,
the use of court-ordered examinations may provide an avenue to
psychological information without compromising the interests advanced in
Jaffee for the privilege. 94
The need for disclosure increases in cases proceeding after the death of
the patient because court-ordered examinations are not an option. Proposed
Rule 504 permitted the opposing party to place the case within the patient-
litigant exception if the patient had died. Taking this position, the Dixon
court concluded that the exception would apply equally if the defendant
placed the decedent's mental state in issue because the patient was
deceased.95 Rather than resting on a waiver theory, this aspect of the
exception appears to be need based. While the patient cannot logically waive
the privilege by dying, the opposing party's need for the information
FED. R. Civ. P. 35(a). See generally JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CML PROCEDURE § 7.12 (2d ed.
1993) (discussing use of Rule 35 examinations). Courts, however, do not read Rule 35 uniformly.
Some are extemely reluctant to order Rule 35 examinations, while others do so more readily. See
generally Bridges v. Eastman Kodak Co., 850 F. Supp. 216 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (summarizing decisions
applying Rule 35). A full consideration of Rule 35 is beyond the scope of this Article.
192. Price v. County of San Diego, 165 F.R.D. 614, 623 (S.D. Cal. 1996).
193. See 3 WEiNSTEiN & BERGER, supra note 85, § 504.07(6).
194. See also Southem Bluegrass Mental Health & Mental Retardation Bd., Inc. v. Angelucci, 609
S.W.2d 931 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980) (refusing to override defendant's claim of privilege, in part, because
state had access to results of several court-ordered exams).
195. See FED. R. EVID. 504(d)(3) (proposed Nov. 20, 1972). Prior to death, the exception only
applies when the patient places her mental state in issue. After the patient's death, relevant mental
health information may be discoverable when any party places the patient's mental state in issue. See
id.
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contained in the records is greater. Although Jaffee's rejection of balancing
raises questions concerning the viability of this approach, it seems the proper
way to address the postmortem interests of the patient and the litigant.
Alternatively, the court could allow the party standing in the patient's
shoes to control the waiver decision. If the privilege is treated as surviving
the patient's death, postmortem control of the privilege lies with the
administrator of the patient's estate.' Therefore, if the claims advanced by
the privilege holder do not bring the case within the patient-litigant
exception, the adverse party could not access the information. While this
approach may often be appropriate, courts should recognize the ongoing
interest in maintaining the privilege must yield to weightier interests in some
cases.
3. The Scope of the Exception
Even when the patient-litigant exception applies, the court should not
order wholesale disclosure of patient records. In many cases the records will
be extensive and will contain extraneous material. Courts should therefore
implement measures to minimize invasion of the area of privacy protected by
the privilege. 1
98
Some courts have succeeded in providing this protection. For example, in
Vasconcellos v. Cybex International, Inc.,'99  the court held that the
defendant's request for documents was overbroad and held that the defendant
196. In Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 2081 (1998), the Court rejected the argument
that the attorney-client privilege could be overcome by the need for information once the client died.
Both the purpose for the privilege and its common-law roots support posthumous application.
Posthumous protection by the psychotherapist-patient privilege is on weaker footing, as evidenced by
the provision in Proposed Rule 504(dX3) for easier access to privileged material under the patient-
litigant exception if the patient is deceased.
197. See, e.g., Rittenhouse v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 595 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
198. See, e.g., Kerman v. City of New York, No. 96 CIV.7865 (LMM), 1997 WL 666261
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 1997) (ordering disclosure of records, but imposing protective order to preserve
plaintiffs privacy as much as possible); Bridges v. Eastman Kodak Co., 850 F. Supp. 216, 223
(S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that, although defendants were entitled to question plaintiffs' therapists
about personal histories, inquiry was strictly "limited to whether, and to what extent, the alleged
harassment caused plaintiffs to suffer emotional harm"); Bond v. District Court, 682 P.2d 33, 38-41
(Colo. 1984) (after finding waiver, instructing trial court to balance benefit of disclosure against
prejudicial impact before issuing discovery order); Yoho v. Lindsley, 248 So. 2d 187, 191 (Fla. Dist.
Ct App. 1971) (noting that scope of patient-litigant waiver should be carefully tailored to protect
privacy interests); Scott v. Flynt, 704 So. 2d 998, 1007 (Miss. 1996) (rejecting argument that plaintiff
was required to execute unconditional waiver of physician-patient privilege and imposing on court an
obligation to protect against unwarranted disclosure). But see Topol v. Trustees of Univ. of Pa., 160
F.R.D. 476, 477 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (stating only that "plaintiff waived any applicable psychotherapist-
patient privilege").
199. 962 F. Supp. 701 (D. Md. 1997).
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could bring a new, more narrowly-tailored subpoena. 00 The court stated that
the defendant must show cause why the privileged information represented
the only possible means to obtain relevant information.20 ' In R.K v.
Ramirez, 2 02 the court ordered disclosure but vacated the trial court's order as
too broad. The court emphasized the trial court's responsibility for protecting
the patient's interests even when disclosure is appropriate and advised the
trial court to redact or delete irrelevant portions of the records.203 In
Cleveland v. International Paper,204 the court explicitly restricted the
defendant's access to confidential information. The court allowed the
defendant to inquire about medical treatment the plaintiff sought as a result
of the alleged discrimination, her medical condition during her employment
by the defendant, and prior medical history only insofar as it related to
showing that her condition did not result from her employment. 0 5 By
carefully detailing and circumscribing disclosure under the patient-litigant
exception, courts can maintain the fairness of the litigation process without
undermining the psychotherapist-patient privilege.
V. Loss OF PROTECTION THROUGH WAIVER OR OTHER ACTION
A 1960 publication intended to guide psychiatrists on matters of
confidentiality and privilege stated:
A waiver implies that the patient has a full knowledge of the content
of his medical-psychiatric record, that he recalls all of the transactions
of the treatment and at the time of waiver he is aware of the
consequences of full disclosure. Waiver also implies that the patient is
competent to make it.
206
This publication overstates the requirement of formality for waiver.
Although in cases of voluntary disclosure the party affirmatively relinquishes
the privilege, the protection may equally be lost through disclosure that is
200. See id. at 709.
201. See id.
202. 887 S.W.2d 836 (rex. 1994).
203. See id. at 844. Moreover, the court stated, "We stress that the highly personal nature of this
information places a heavy responsibility on the trial court to prevent any disclosure that is broader
than necessary." Id.
204. No. 96-CV-1068 (RSP-DNH), 1997 WL 309408 (N.D.N.Y. 1997).
205. See id. at *3; see also Bridges v. Eastman Kodak Co., 850 F. Supp. 216, 223 (S.D.N.Y.
1994).
206. COMMITTEE ON PSYCHIATRY & LAW, GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY,
REPORT NO. 45, CONFIDENTIALITY AND PRIWLEGED COMMUNICATION IN THE PRACTICE OF
PSYCHIATRY 99 (1960).
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inconsistent with confidentiality. Through this avenue a party may lose the
protection of the privilege unwittingly. Additionally, the party cannot control
precisely the scope of the waiver; disclosure for a limited purpose may effect
a broad waiver of the privilege.
In addition to defining the contours of the psychotherapist-patient
privilege, courts must determine what constitutes a waiver of the privilege.
Some jurisdictions will not recognize a waiver unless the party takes a clear
and intentional step to effect the waiver.20 7
The proposed Federal Rules of Evidence included a general rule
governing waiver of privileges. Proposed Rule 511 provided, "A person upon
whom these rules confer a privilege against disclosure of the confidential
matter or communication waives the privilege if he or his predecessor while
holder of the privilege voluntarily discloses or consents to disclosure of any
significant part of the matter of communication." 20 8 The rule rests on the
rationale that disclosure destroys confidentiality and therefore eliminates the
purpose of the privilege.09
In United States v. Wimberly,210 the court stated the prevailing standard
for waiver as "the voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known
right."211 Consistent with this standard, the clearest waiver is the patient's
voluntary election to reveal privileged information. But other acts of
207. See, e.g., State ex rel. Gozenbach v. Eberwein, 655 S.W.2d 794, 796 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983)
(finding no waiver of physician-patient privilege absent showing of unequivocal and decisive acts
which demonstrate clear intention to waive privilege).
Conversely, federal courts have not enforced such a strict barrier to waiver of the attorney-client
privilege. Even the inadvertent act of the attorney disclosing otherwise privileged material can defeat a
claim of privilege. See, e.g., Harmony Gold U.S.A. v. FASA Corp., 169 F.R.D. 113, 116-18 (N.D. Ill.
1996) (holding that inadvertent disclosure of privileged material waived attorney-client privilege
because privacy was irretrievably surrendered); Davidson Pipe Co. v. Laventhol & Horwath, 120
F.RLD. 455 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding that intent to waive privilege is evidenced by act of disclosure,
even if that act was inadvertent). Although some aspects of the law governing attorney-client privilege
might transfer to the law of psychotherapist-patient privilege, some aspects fit poorly.
208. FED. R. EVID. 511 (proposed Nov. 20, 1972).
209. See FED. K. EviD. 511 advisory committee's note (proposed Nov. 20, 1972). See also Farrow
v. Allen, 608 N.Y.S.2d I (N.Y. App. Div. 1993), where the court held:
It follows therefore that, even if the information was intended to remain confidential when it was
communicated, once a patient puts the information into the hands of a third party who is
completely unconnected to his or her treatment and who is not subject to any privilege, it can no
longer be considered a confidence and the privilege must be deemed to have been waived as to
that information.
Id. at 3 (citations omitted).
210. 60 F.3d 281 (7th Cir. 1995).
211. Id. at 285 (citation omitted); see also State ex rel. Hayter v. Griffin, 785 S.W.2d 590, 594
(Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (finding no waiver because patient's acts "were not so clearly unequivocal and
decisive as to demonstrate a purpose to abandon the privilege"); State ex rel. Gozenbach v. Eberwein,
655 S.W.2d 794, 796 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (requiring "clear unequivocal and decisive act").
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voluntary disclosure may also waive the protection. For example, in Mann v.
University of Cincinnati,212 prior to litigation the plaintiff sent one page of
her psychotherapist's record to the defendant university accompanied by a
letter notifying the university of her reasons for withdrawal.213 The court held
that, although the plaintiff had not waived her privilege as to other
information contained in her record, this voluntary disclosure waived the
privilege as to that particular page.214 In Hosey v. Presbyterian Church
(US.A), 215 the court, applying Kansas law, held that the deceased patient
waived the statutory privilege extended to patients of mental health treatment
facilities when he shared with the governing body of the Presbyterian Church
both the fact that he had been treated and details of the diagnosis he received
from the clinic.
216
Some courts, however, find a waiver of the privilege too quickly. If courts
find waivers too readily they are likely to diminish the effectiveness of the
privilege. The salutary impact of the privilege rests on the patient's
expectation that the communications will remain confidential unless the
patient takes steps to permit disclosure. Waiver rules that wrest control from
the patient will threaten to undermine the goal expressed in Jaffee of
fostering an atmosphere of trust and open communication in therapeutic
217
sessions. Therefore, courts should approach waiver arguments with
caution, particularly those that too greatly diminish the protection of the
privilege.
A. Voluntary Partial Disclosure
Even partial disclosure may waive the privilege. If the patient fails to
assert the privilege and discloses some privileged information, the disclosure
may act as a broad waiver, permitting the court to compel further disclosure.
The rule embodied in Proposed Rule 511 addresses those concerns.218
Some courts, however, attach broad implications to partial disclosure. For
example, in Mitchell v. Sturm, Ruger & Co.,2 19 the plaintiffs voluntarily
provided the defendant with a report from one treating psychologist dealing
212. 824F. Supp. 1190,1192 (S.D. Ohio 1993).
213. See id at 1205.
214. See id.
215. 160F.R.D. 161, 164-65(D. Kan. 1995).
216. See id.; see also Hancock v. Dodson, 958 F.2d 1367 (6th Cir. 1992) (finding that under
Michigan law, patient waived physician-patient privilege by voluntarily producing treating physician's
records).
217. Seesupra PartI.A.
218. See supra notes 208-09 and accompanying text.
219. 842 F. Supp. 158 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
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with the shooting that precipitated the litigation but asserted the privilege as
to communications with other psychologists.220 Perhaps wary of the attempt
to pick and choose which privileged material to disclose, the court held that
by providing the favorable report the plaintiffs waived the psychologist-
patient privilege.221 The waiver extended to all communications on that
subject, even those with other psychologists.222 In United States v.
Snelenberger,223 the court held that the patient waived his psychotherapist-
patient privilege by telling third parties of his intention to commit a crime,
even though he did not disclose his communications to the therapist or
matters concerning his therapy.224 Based on that waiver, the court permitted
the therapist to testify concerning the patient's communications to her.225
Although Mitchell represents a fair decision in light of the partial disclosure
made with advice of counsel, Snelenberger attaches far too sweeping
consequences to a limited disclosure.
Not all courts give partial disclosure such broad effect. In Bognar v. Zayre
Corp.,226 the court rejected the argument that under Ohio law the production
of one privileged document, which was provided to defendant's insurer and
introduced at trial, represented a complete waiver.227 Similarly, in Farrow v.
Allen, 228 the court held that the patient effected only a partial waiver when
she authorized her psychiatrist to send a letter to a third party revealing
certain matters she had communicated during treatment.229 The letter waived
220. See id. at 159.
221. Seeid.
222. See id.; see also Whitbeck v. Vital Signs, Inc., 163 F.RtD. 398, 400 (D.D.C. 1995) (holding
that by providing favorable portions of her medical records, plaintiff waived medical privilege as to all
her records); Jones v. Superior Court, 174 Cal. Rptr. 148, 155-56 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (considering
alleged waiver of physician-patient privilege, noting that "the scope of waiver is not limited to what
the patient intends," and concluding that, although waiver should extend to communications with other
physicians on same subject, waiver did not extend "to all communications with any physician at any
time"); Carson v. Fine, 867 P.2d 610, 615 (Wash. 1994) ("[W]alver of [physician-patient] privilege as
to one of plaintiff's physicians also constitutes a waiver as to other physicians who attended the
plaintiff with regard to the disability or ailment at issue."). But cf Mann v. University of Cincinnati,
824 F. Supp. 1190 (S.D. Ohio 1993) (holding that waiver of one page of psychotherapist record did not
constitute waiver of entire record).
223. 24 F.3d 799 (6th Cir. 1994).
224. See id. at 802.
225. See id. The court also suggested that the testimony would be allowed under an exception for
communication of a threat. See id.
226. 702 F. Supp. 151 (N.D. Ohio 1988).
227. See id. at 154; see also Schaffer v. Spicer, 215 N.W.2d 134, 138 (S.D. 1974) (rejecting
argument that patient waived physician-patient privilege when she testified that she had consulted
physician and that he had diagnosed her problems but did not testify concerning nature of or treatment
for illness or recount any communications with physician).
228. 608 N.Y.S.2d I (N.Y. App. Div. 1993).
229. See id. at 4.
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the privilege as to the information it contained but did not effect a general
waiver of the privilege.23' In Simpson v. Braider,231 the defendant did not
waive the physician-patient privilege by providing limited information
concerning their son's treatment.132 In State v. Ermatinger,233 the Missouri
court refused to find a waiver where, during his deposition, the victim of an
alleged deviate sexual assault provided the name of his treating psychiatrist
and answered a question concerning whether the doctor had prescribed any
medication. The court concluded that the victim "did not clearly indicate that
his purpose was to abandon the physician-patient privilege." 234
Consequently, the Missouri requirement of a "clear unequivocal and decisive
act showing such purpose" was not met.235 These cases illustrate an
appropriately protective position.
In addition, disclosure should not act as a waiver when made in a
confidential setting. For example, in Ex Parte Rudder,2 36 the court upheld a
claim of psychiatrist-patient privilege even though the patient provided
records to the Board of Medical Examiners to assist in their investigation of
the psychiatrist. The court held that this disclosure did not waive the patient's
privilege because the disclosure to the Board was itself confidential. 237
A difficult question can arise in criminal cases when the victim of a crime
grants the prosecutor access to privileged records. The defendant may ask the
court to construe the victim's action as a waiver that allows the defendant
access to the information.23 8 In Reynolds v. State,239 the court carefully
assessed the consequences of the victim's disclosure to the prosecution. First,
230. See id.
231. 104 F.R.D. 512 (D.D.C. 1985); see also Roberts v. Superior Court, 508 P.2d 309 (Cal. 1973)
(en bane) (disclosing existence or purpose of psychotherapist-patient relationship did not waive
privilege).
232. The defendant's lawyer provided information concerning his mental health in sentencing in
an unrelated case. See Simpson, 104 F.R.D. at 522. In addition, in response to interrogatories, the
defendant provided names of his therapists and a general description of the reason he sought therapy.
See id. at 523.
233. 752 S.W.2d 344 (Mo. CL App. 1988).
234. Id. at 350.
235. Id.
236. 507So. 2d411 (Ala. 1987).
237. See id. at 413; see also McMaster v. Iowa Bd. of Psychology Exam'r, 509 N.W.2d 754 (Iowa
1993) (discussing Iowa statute that establishes right of examiners to access privileged records for
disciplinary hearings); Commonwealth v. Askew, 666 A.2d 1062 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (finding no
waiver of sexual assault counselor privilege where statute required counselor to provide information to
police and to physician who performed medical tests on minor victim).
238. See, e.g., Reynolds v. State, 633 A.2d 455 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993) (patient executed
limited waiver allowing prosecutor to review mental health records); Askew, 666 A.2d at 1062 (patient
allowed psychologist to reveal child abuse allegation to police and physician).
239. 633 A.2d 455 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993).
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the court held that the disclosure did not effect a broad waiver.240 It stated
that it will recognize a limited waiver "if there is a reasonable basis for the
particular limitation.' 241 The court emphasized the confidential relationship
between the victim and the prosecutor and refused to attach a similar
limitation to the victim's waiver of her privilege at trial. 242 Once the victim
allowed the prosecution to introduce some of her mental health records at
trial, however, the court held that she waived the privilege entirely. The
defendant could then inspect and introduce any other records.243
Some courts do not accept the notion of a limited waiver in this context.
In State v. Gonzales,244 the court rejected the prosecution's argument that the
victim could disclose her mental health records to the state without effecting
a waiver of her privilege.245 The court reasoned that because the relationship
with the prosecutor is not privileged, the disclosure of the records breached
confidentiality and waived the privilege.246
Reynolds reflects a fair balance between the rights of the accused and the
victim. The victim should not lose the protection of the privilege merely
because she has made allegations of criminal wrongdoing and is expected to
testify against the accused. The prosecution, however, should be permitted to
review relevant mental health records. The information contained in those
records may help the prosecutor reach an appropriate decision about both the
merits of the charges against the accused and the victim's credibility. The
accused derives some protection from the prosecutor's constitutional247 and
ethical obligation 8 to disclose exculpatory information. Since exculpatory
information includes evidence that would impeach the prosecution's
witness, 249 if the prosecutor's review of the victim's mental health records
240. See id. at 462.
241. Id.; see also Avery v. State, 292 A.2d 728, 740-41 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1972) (holding that
complainant did not automatically waive privilege by virtue of cooperating with authorities).
242. See Reynolds, 633 A.2d at 462.
243. See id.
244. 912 P.2d 297 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996).
245. See id. at 300.
246. See id.
247. The prosecutor has a duty to disclose to the defendant any exculpatory and material
information; failure to produce such evidence violates defendant's due process rights. See United
States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985); Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 794 (1972); Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
248. Rule 3.8(d) of the American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct
provides that a prosecutor shall "make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information
known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense, and, in
connection with sentencing, disclose to the defense and to the tribunal all unprivileged mitigating
information known to the prosecutor." MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 38(d) (1994).
249. See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676 (holding that prosecutor's constitutional duty to disclose
exculpatory evidence includes impeachment evidence).
13891998]
Washington University Open Scholarship
1390 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
reveals any information that tends to undermine the victim's credibility, the
prosecutor must disclose it to the defense.
In addition, as the Reynolds court recognized, the defendant may be
entitled to in camera inspection of the victim's records. Such review should
be unavailable if the victim stands on her privilege and denies the prosecutor
access to her records. But the court should grant the defendant's request for
in camera review if the victim has effected a partial waiver to permit
prosecutorial review.
B. Inadvertent or Unconsented Disclosure
Parties sometimes argue that the privilege is lost by inadvertent or
unconsented disclosure. A patient may discover that a system of information
storage or reporting that gives access to personnel not identified closely
enough with the psychotherapist may defeat the privilege.250 The basis of the
argument against enforcing the protection of privilege in such cases is that
the context suggests that the patient did not intend to keep the
communications confidential and, therefore, lost the privilege's protection.
Clearly, the attorney-client privilege must be guarded with care. A key
difference between inadvertent disclosure by an attorney and inadvertent
disclosure by a therapist or record-holder is that the attorney functions as an
agent of the client. Therefore, the attorney has the authority to waive the
client's privilege.25 1 In contrast, in the case of inadvertent disclosure, the
therapist and holders of mental health records act without authority when
they reveal the patient's privileged information. They have no authority to
waive the privilege. 2  Nevertheless, a therapist's disclosure of a client's
250. See, e.g., State ex reL Benoit v. Randall, 431 S.W.2d 107 (Mo. 1968) (en bane). The Supreme
Court has suggested that sharing information in the normal course of business eliminates an
individual's privacy interest in that information. In United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976), the
Court held that the Fourth Amendment did not govern the production of bank records pursuant to a
subpoena because the documents obtained by the subpoena "contain only information voluntarily
conveyed to the banks and exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of business." Id. at 442.
Although Miller raised issues distinct from questions of privilege, the Court's decision
nevertheless illustrates the importance the Court may attach to the sharing of information with third
parties, even in a setting where some confidentiality could be expected. The Court should not
transplant this reasoning into privilege disputes, or conclude that no privilege protects otherwise
confidential information when the patient, voluntarily or not, participates in a system that contemplates
that the support personnel and not merely the therapist will have access to the patient's records.
251. Although the privilege belongs to the client only, the attorney can waive the privilege when
acting under the client's authority. See 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2325
(McNaughten rev. 1961). The authority to waive is implied when the attorney makes admissions or
disclosures or performs other acts in the course of litigation. See id.
252. See, e.g., Tucson Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Rowles, 520 P.2d 518, 523 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1974) (holding
that only patient or physician, and not hospital, can waive privilege); Parkson v. Central DuPage
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privileged information can eliminate the privilege not only as to the item
disclosed but also as to other related material.
253
Psychotherapists have opportunities to inadvertently reveal privileged
matter that may compromise the patient's privilege. 4 When confidential
information communicated within psychotherapy is memorialized in a
record, a risk arises that unprivileged eyes could view the record. 5 Although
the nature of the psychotherapeutic setting varies, some settings create
opportunities for unconsented disclosure. If the psychotherapy is provided in
a small practice and records are maintained merely for the professional
working with the patient, unconsented disclosure is unlikely. When
psychotherapy is provided in a larger institutional setting, such as a hospital
or agency, however, more employees are likely to handle the records. This
setting increases the risk of inadvertent disclosure. Some may argue that such
exposure constitutes a waiver. Similarly, a therapist who includes extraneous
but otherwise privileged information in documents filed with the insurance
company or responds to a discovery request without asserting the patient's
privilege may thereby defeat the patient's later claim of privilege. Therefore,
psychotherapists must implement safety precautions designed to avoid
inadvertent waiver.
256
Even with precautions in place, however, some unconsented disclosure of
privileged information will occur. Therefore, courts must define when
inadvertant disclosure of privileged information constitutes a waiver. In State
ex rel. Benoit v. Randall, 7 the Missouri court considered the argument that
hospital records were not shielded by the physician-patient privilege. The
Hosp., 435 N.E.2d 140, 144 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (same).
253. See, e.g., Texaco Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Department of Consumer Affairs, 60 F.3d 867, 883-84
(1st Cir. 1995) (holding that inadvertent waiver effectuates waiver for "all other such communications
on the same subject" (citations omitted)).
254. The special but pervasive problem of whether filing the required forms for insurance
coverage affects a waiver is discussed separately below. See supra Part V.C.
255. See, e.g., Estate of Behringer v. Medical Ctr. at Princeton, 592 A.2d 1251 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1991) (considering suit in which deceased physician's estate sued medical center for harm to
physician when medical center failed to maintain confidentiality of doctor's medical records); see also
FED. R. EviD. 504(a)(3) (proposed Nov. 20, 1972).
256. When privileged attorney-client communications are inadvertently disclosed during
discovery, some courts conduct their waiver analysis by balancing the adequacy of the implemented
safeguards with the scope of the discovery request. See Bank Brussels Lambert v. Credit Lyonnais
(Suisse) S.A., 160 F.R.D. 437, 443-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (finding that attorney's inadvertent disclosure
did not waive privilege because scope of discovery was extensive and precautions taken by attorney
were reasonable). Rhode Island's Confidentiality of Health Care Information Act reflects a possible
approach to encourage precautions. This act requires third parties who receive confidential health care
information to establish specified minimum security procedures. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-37.3-4(c)
(1997).
257. 431 S.W.2d 107 (Mo. 1968).
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court noted, "Hospital insurance, with its attendant waiver forms, is common.
Hospital records are seen and copied by staff members and employees. The
element of strict secrecy cannot be present under these circumstances.
2 58
Nevertheless, the court concluded that it would apply the privilege rule to
hospital records.
2 9
Courts should take the position that information retains its privileged
status even though it is recorded where workers who maintain records or
process reimbursement claims will have access to it. A privilege has little
value if modem recordkeeping deprives it of utility.
C. Disclosure Requiredfor Third Party Payment
The interaction of insurance coverage or other third party payment for
psychotherapy and evidentiary concepts of waiver raises concern. When a
patient seeks insurance coverage for therapy, the patient and therapist must
share some information with the insurance company.260 The patient must
either submit a claim or authorize the therapist to submit a claim. A party
later seeking records of the treatment may argue that the disclosure to the
insurance company represents a waiver of the privilege.261 If this argument
prevails, the privilege becomes insignificant in all but the exceptional cases
in which the patient is not eligible for or does not seek insurance coverage.262
Dr. Jerome Beigler discussed the privacy concerns raised by insurance
coverage for psychotherapy and the battles therapists have fought to preserve
privacy while seeking insurance for psychotherapy.263 Concerns for privacy
arose when patients were insured through an employer and confidential
information leaked through personnel offices back to the patient and others in
the workplace. In some cases, information in employment files reflecting
psychotherapy negatively affected advancement or future employment
258. Id. at 109.
259. See id.
260. See SWENSON, supra note 25, at 70. Insurance companies usually require practitioners to
supply "demographic information, a diagnosis, a treatment plan, and evidence that services were
provided." Id. Some insurance carriers and most health maintenance organizations also require
information pertaining to symptoms and the effects of the client's disorder on employment and family
relationships. See id,
261. See, e.g., In re Pebsworth, 705 F.2d 261,262-63 (7th Cir. 1983) (finding waiver when patient
filed insurance claim, noting that "reasonable patient would no doubt be aware that routine processing
of reimbursement claims would require these records to be brought into the hands of numerous
anonymous employees").
262. Some patients will even bypass insurance to avoid the consequent breach of confidentiality.
See Jerome S. Beigler, Privacy and Confidentiality, in LAW AND ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF
PSYCHIATRY 69,70 (Charles K. Hofling ed., 1981).
263. See id. at 70-77.
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opportunities due to prejudice against those with a history of mental
illness.264 Insurance companies compound the problem by requesting
detailed information from patient files, which sometimes goes beyond
legitimate insurance needs. 265 Beigler suggests, among other responses,
apprising the patient of the information submitted to the insurance company
and, if the request for information is too invasive, resisting.266
Despite some victories in the reimbursement context, mental health
professionals risk losing ground in their efforts to protect their clients'
privacy in legal actions. Some courts regard the delivery of information to
the insurance company as waiving the psychotherapist-patient privilege.267 In
some cases, the waiver appears restricted to the information transmitted to
the insurance carrier. In the cases defining the pre-Jaffee federal approach, In
re Pebsworth and In re Zuniga, the courts only addressed whether the
privilege shielded patient-identifying information. Thus, the information
sought had already been submitted to the insurance company in its
entirety.268 In the case of In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated
Jan. 30, 1986269 the court recognized a waiver but noted that whether
documents fell within the waiver required reference to particular documents;
the court would not recognize a general waiver.270
In other cases, however, courts construe waiver broadly. For example, in
Gould v. Durkin,271 the court held that the patient waived her privilege when
she agreed to a reimbursement process in which the therapist submitted
records, including her diagnosis, to the insurance carrier. As the court pointed
out, she "was aware that her records, including her diagnosis, would fall into
the hands of numerous employees of [the insurance company]. 272 Based on
this waiver, the court ordered both the psychotherapist and the insurance
company to produce all records regarding the patient's mental condition or
psychiatric treatment provided to her.273 Thus, the waiver extended beyond
the information submitted to the insurance company and exposed the
264. See id. at 70.
265. Seeid.at7l.
266. See id. at 77.
267. See, e.g., In re Pebsworth, 705 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982); Gould v. Durkin, 96-CV-6249, 1997
WL 256950 (E.D. Pa. May 15, 1997); Jones v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 388 A.2d 476 (D.C.
1978).
268. See In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632 (6th Cir 1983); In re Pebsworth, 705 F.2d 261 (7th Cir.
1983).
269. 638 F. Supp. 794 (D. Me. 1986).
270. See id. at 798-99.
271. 96-CV-6249, 1997 WL 256950 (E.D. Pa. May 15, 1997).
272. Id. at*4.
273. See id.
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therapist's records as well.
The position that submitting mental health treatment records for insurance
reimbursement constitutes a waiver rests on notions of confidentiality.
Proposed Rule 504(a)(3) stated:
A communication is "confidential" if not intended to be disclosed to
third persons other than those present to further the interest of the
patient in the consultation, examination, or interview, or persons
reasonably necessary for the transmission of the communication, or
persons who are participating in the diagnosis and treatment under the
direction of the psychotherapist, including members of the patient's
family.
27 4
Some courts view the communication of any information to any party outside
the privileged relationship as contrary to notions of confidentiality. The better
approach is to view the patient's consent to submit for reimbursement as a
limited waiver permitting use of the information for reimbursement only.275
To equate the disclosure made for insurance with disclosure to any other
unrelated third party gives the privilege too little force. Mental health
treatment is frequently covered by insurance. To activate that coverage, the
patient or therapist must submit documentation to the insurance company
verifying the treatment and any other information the company requires. To
treat that submission as a waiver will render the privilege ineffective in all
psychotherapeutic relationships except those paid for privately. If, as Jaffee
assumes, the threat of disclosure deters patients from acting openly in
therapy, a rule that translates every insurance claim into a waiver of the
privilege will deter those in need of therapy but unable to pay for it out of
pocket from seeking therapy. Such a rule negates the important individual
and societal goals served by psychotherapy.
274. FED. R. EVID. 504(a)(3) (proposed Nov. 20, 1972).
275. See, e.g., In re Search Warrant for 2045 Franklin, 709 P.2d 597, 601 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985)
(receipt of Medicaid implicitly waives physician-patient privilege "to the extent necessary for the state
to verify the services billed by the provider"); Parkson v. Central DuPage Hosp., 435 N.E.2d 140 (I11.
App. Ct. 1982) (holding that patients' authorizations to release medical information to agencies
concerned with third party payment was only limited waiver and did not permit disclosure to others);
State es rel. Gozenbach v. Eberwein, 655 S.W.2d 794 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that patient's
actions represented waiver only to extent necessary to obtain treatment and payment for expenses); see
also, e.g., LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 510 (vest 1998) (providing that communications are confidential
even when transmitted to obtain indemnification); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4507 (McKinney 1998) (providing
that authorization of disclosure for purpose of obtaining insurance benefits does not constitute waiver).
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In Pebsworth, Judge Gray, in his concurring opinion, argued against a
broad waiver rule:
It seems to me that the traditional waiver doctrines are inappropriate in
the context of present-day medical insurance. Such insurance plans
have gained national prevalence and exist to encourage the creation of
doctor-patient relationships where necessary to protect a person's
physical and mental well-being. Moreover, they are designed to lessen
the considerable financial burdens that, in the absence of insurance,
would force many people to gamble with their health. Since the
doctor-patient privilege exists to encourage such relationships and
protect them when they are made, policies behind health insurance and
the privilege go hand in hand.276
In Pebsworth, the majority, however, discounted the negative impact of the
waiver doctrine, concluding that patients already contemplated an intrusion
on the privacy of their treatment through the process of reimbursement
277
Although courts should not treat submission of information for insurance
coverage as a general waiver of the privilege, they should treat such
submissions as a limited waiver that defeats a claim of privilege in litigation
between the insurance company and the patient.278 By filing an insurance
claim or authorizing the health care provider to seek reimbursement, the
patient agrees to permit the insurance company access to the limited
information necessary for reimbursement purposes. If the insurance company
questions patients' eligibility for coverage, it should be permitted to use the
otherwise privileged information in its possession.
For example, in Principal Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Eady,279 the
hospital provided treatment to Eady and then sought reimbursement from the
276. In re Pebsworth, 705 F.2d 261, 264 (7th Cir. 1983) (Gray, J., concurring); see also
Gozenbach, 655 S.W.2d at 796 (expressing concern that if patient waived physician-patient privilege
by submitting records to insurer, patients would be discouraged from seeking appropriate medical care,
contrary to policy of privilege).
277. Pebsworth, 705 F.2d at 264; see also In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632, 640 (6th Cir. 1983)
(following Pebsworth and finding patients waived privilege by disclosing information to third-party
insurance provider).
278. An analogous waiver is generally invoked by life insurance companies to access medical
records of an insured who allegedly gave inaccurate answers to medical questions to obtain life
insurance coverage. Courts enforce such waivers to allow the insurance company to use otherwise
privileged information to defend against suits to recover the insurance proceeds. See, e.g., Leach v.
Millers Life Ins. Co., 400 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1968) (construing Mississippi law); Jones v. Prudential
Ins. Co. of America, 388 A.2d 476 (D.C. 1978); Hammer v. Investors Life Ins. Co., 473 N.W.2d 884
(Minn. Ct. App. 1991); Woelfling v. Great-West Life Assurance Co., 285 N.E.2d 61 (Ohio Ct. App.
1972).
279. 889 F. Supp. 1067 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
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insurance company under a policy that covered employees of Eady's Scale.
The insurance company asked the hospital to provide any medical records
regarding Eady's treatment to substantiate treatment for which the hospital
sought reimbursement. Eady signed an authorization form, permitting the
hospital to give his records to the insurance company. The hospital provided
the records to the insurance company, and the insurance company
determined that Eady was not employed by Eady's Scale. Therefore, it
denied coverage.280 The court concluded that in his authorization Eady had
waived his privilege as to the records submitted to the insurance company.
28
'
In Eady, the court had no reason to consider the extent of the waiver and
did not address whether the authorization to provide records to the insurance
company represented a comprehensive waiver of the plaintiff's privilege.
Had the court addressed this question, it should have found a limited waiver,
restricted to use of the records by the insurance company to determine the
propriety of reimbursement. In Henry v. Lewis, 28 2 the court rejected the
argument that the disclosure form authorizing release of "any information
which may be necessary to determine benefits payable" constituted a general
waiver of the physician-patient privilege and, appropriately, viewed the form
as effecting only a limited waiver.283
When the patient gives a limited waiver, a question may arise concerning
whether specific information is encompassed within the waiver. In Principal
Mutual, it was unclear whether the hospital submitted only the records
necessary for reimbursement evaluation and therefore came within the
waiver.284 The company requested "any medical records regarding Eady's
treatment."2 85 If the hospital responded with records not necessary for
reimbursement, such as notes of therapeutic sessions, it exceeded the waiver
and the extraneous information should retain its privileged status.286
Courts should regard the consent to disclosure of privileged records for
insurance purposes as restricted and enforce it cautiously. The health care
provider lacks authority to waive the privilege and, therefore, should not be
permitted effectively to expand the patient's waiver by including extraneous
records in the material provided to the insurance company.
280. See id. at 1069-70.
281. See id. at 1072.
282. 478 N.Y.S.2d 263 (N.Y. Sup. Ct 1984).
283. Id. at 268.
284. See Principal Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Eady, 889 F. Supp. 1067 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
285. Id. at 1070.
286. See id. at 1072.
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VI. FORCING THE PRIVILEGE: PROCEDURAL ISSUES
A. Standing to Assert the Privilege
Effective protection turns in part on recognition that persons or entities
other than the patient must be given standing to assert the psychotherapist-
patient privilege. Courts should not simply dismiss claims on grounds of lack
of standing. Instead, they should address the substantive issues raised by the
assertion of the privilege.
The basic standing rule applied in federal287 and state288 courts is that, in
addition to the patient, the patient's representative or the therapist may assert
the privilege, but the authority to waive belongs only to the patient or the
patient's legal representative. The Proposed Rule would have codified this
rule, providing that the patient or one of several representatives could claim
the privilege and that the psychotherapist may claim the privilege but only on
behalf of the patient.289 This approach acknowledges that sometimes the
patient is not competent to assert the privilege and recognizes that the patient
does not always control possession and knowledge of the privileged
information. Therefore, it identifies a limited class of those who may claim
the privilege for the patient.
The law is less uniform, however, on whether the privilege can be
asserted by any person or entity other than the patient, the patient's legal
representative, or the psychotherapist. A number of state and federal courts
reject claims of psychotherapist-patient privilege because the party asserting
the privilege lacked standing to raise it. For example, in the case of In re
August, 1993 Regular Grand Jury (Clinic Subpoena),29 the court rejected
the hospital's motion to quash a subpoena for mental health records in its
possession. The court pointed to the language of Proposed Rule 504 and the
Indiana privilege statute, stating that the hospital "simply cannot claim the
privilege on behalf of patients treated by psychotherapists at the hospital
merely because it is the custodian of the records."29'
287. See, e.g., United States v. Hansen, 955 F. Supp. 1225 (D. Mont. 1997) (holding that
psychotherapist has standing to assert privilege on behalf of deceased patient).
288. See, e.g., Sarphie v. Rowe, 618 So. 2d 905, 907 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that
psychotherapist may assert privilege on behalf of patient).
289. See FED. R. EViD. 504(aX3)(c) (proposed Nov. 20, 1972).
290. 854 F. Supp. 1380 (S.D. Ind. 1994).
291. Id. at 1392. In a companion case, the court entertained a claim of psychotherapist-patient
privilege advanced by a corporation. The court neither explained why the corporation had standing nor
described the corporation's business or relationship to the records and patients. See In re August, 1993
Regular Grand Jury (Medical Corporation Subpoena 11), 854 F. Supp. 1392 (S.D. Ind. 1993). The
challenged grand jury subpoena, however, sought "records in connection with submission of claims for
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Similarly, in the case of In re Grand Jury No. 91-1,292 a mental health
center asserted a deceased patient's privilege to resist a subpoena for his
mental health records.293 The court held that the Center "cannot effectively
resist this subpoena until one competent to claim the privilege does, in fact
claim it.",294 Relying on the language of the Proposed Rule, the court
concluded that only the patient or the patient's personal representative could
claim the privilege, even though it was unclear whether a representative had
been designated.295 The court stated that if no representative stepped forward
to claim the privilege, the motion to quash the subpoena would be denied.296
The approach reflected in these decisions is too narrow. Unless standing
is granted to a broader class of entities, a party may circumvent the privilege
when he locates privileged information in the possession of an entity without
standing. The accessibility of privileged material through this route will
undermine the privilege. To effectuate the federal psychotherapist-patient
privilege, courts must adopt an inclusive rule of standing.
At the time the proposed rules were under consideration, the drafters may
well have envisioned psychotherapy as treatment delivered primarily in
private practices where the therapist maintained the only records. In that
setting, the privilege is adequately protected by recognizing standing only in
the patient, the patient's legal representative, and the therapist. In the more
than twenty years since that time, however, the setting of mental health
services delivery has changed; the definition of standing to raise the privilege
should change accordingly. The role of institutions in the delivery of mental
health services, the involvement of a wider range of professionals and
support staff in the delivery of services, and the institutional maintenance of
mental health records has greatly expanded. The modem structure of health
care institutions mandates a broader concept of standing to assert the
privilege.
Not all therapists maintain a private practice in which they control their
patients' records. Many therapists provide care in institutional settings where
a patient may receive therapy from a variety of professionals working within
the institution.297 The therapist may depart, leaving patient records in the
reimbursement that were filed with" insurance carriers. Id. at 1395. One can infer that the corporation
was itself the service provider and, in the eyes of the court, occupied the position of therapist in
asserting the privilege.
292. 795 F. Supp. 1057 (D. Colo. 1992).
293. See id. at 1058.
294. Id. at 1059.
295. See id.
296. See id
297. See, e.g., Southern Bluegrass Mental Health & Mental Retardation Bd., Inc. v. Angelucci,
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custody of the parent institution.298 When a patient receives therapy in an
institutional setting, the institution plays a paramount role in maintaining the
confidentiality of the records. Because of this structure, records or
information shielded by the psychotherapist-patient privilege are far more
likely to be held or seen by someone other than the parties to the privilege
than are privileged legal documents.
Courts should recognize this change in the practice of psychotherapy and
permit a broader class of parties to assert the privilege for the patient. 99 Once
a party advances the privilege, the court may then determine whether the
information falls within some exception or look to the patient or the patient's
representative to waive the privilege.
In some cases, courts have entertained claims of privilege without
considering standing. For example, in Pebsworth, both Blue Cross/Blue
Shield and the therapist asserted the privilege, 3°° and the court did not
comment on the standing of the insurance company. In Lora, the court
entertained the claim of privilege asserted by the Board of Education on
behalf of students whose records might be selected randomly.301 The
plaintiffs sought records to establish a pattern of discrimination in the
Board's assignment of students to special schools for students identified as
socially or emotionally maladjusted. Due to the methodological importance
of random selection, the Lora court could not seek waivers from the students
without eliminating the evidentiary use of the records. The court therefore
evaluated the claim of privilege, held that it did not foreclose the discovery,
and ordered disclosure of the records subject to appropriate protective orders.
Some states recognize the role of entities outside the privileged
relationship in enforcing other privileges and have therefore held that
recordholders have standing.30 2 In Southern Bluegrass Mental Health v.
Angelucci,30 3 the Kentucky court held that a corporation that provided mental
health services had standing to raise a client's psychiatrist-patient privilege.
609 S.W.2d 931, 932 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980) (describing treatment as including "individual-group
therapy which included interviews with staff psychiatrists, psychologists and staff social workers").
298. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 842 F. Supp. 158, 159 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (patient
treated by several professionals).
299. See generally Ralph W. Tar, Note, Protecting the Privacy of the Absent Patient: Rudnick v.
Superior Court, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 99 (1975) (advocating expanded standing for physician-patient
privilege).
300. See In re Pebsworth, 705 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1983).
301. See Lora v. Board of Educ., 74 F.R.D. 565 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
302. See, e.g., Parkson v. Central DuPage Hosp., 435 N.E.2d 140 (Ill. App. Ct 1982) (holding that
hospital had standing to assert physician-patient privilege).
303. 609 S.W.2d 931 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).
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In Shaw v. Metzger,304 the Delaware court held that a medical center had
standing to assert the physician-patient privilege. The court commented, "To
deny the hospital the right to assert the privilege of patients unaware of the
effort to pierce the privilege would render the protection of the privilege
ineffective." 30 5 The courts of several other states have agreed with the
holding in Shaw.06 In the case of In re Grand Jury Investigation of
Onondaga County,307 the court noted that courts must permit hospitals to
assert the privilege to protect patients, who have not waived the privilege.30 8
Some courts have also held that a recordholder has an obligation to assert a
privilege.
309
At the very least, the federal courts should permit recordholders to raise
the psychotherapist-patient privilege. If the patient is not a party in the case,
the recordholder may be the only entity in a position to protect the patient's
interest in privacy. Rulings summarily dismissing recordholders' claims of
privilege for lack of standing create a breach in the protection of the
privilege, threatening to undermine its goals of fostering communication.
Other situations may call for more creative approaches. The standing
question is more difficult when the entity raising the privilege is not even the
304. No. 77C-DE-101, 1982 WL 172853 (Del. Super. Ct. Nov. 22, 1982).
305. Id. at *2; see also Monsanto Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., No. 88C-JA-118, 1992 WL
182320 (Del. Super. Ct May 26, 1992) (following Shaw and holding that employer had standing to
assert privilege to resist disclosure of records of employees who had been examined by company
physicians).
306. See, e.g., Tucson Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Rowles, 520 P.2d 518, 523 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1974) (holding
that, despite absence of statutory language, privilege covered hospital records and, therefore, could be
asserted by hospital when neither physician nor patient is party to proceedings); Parkson, 435 N.E.2d
140 (holding that hospital "was mandated to assert the physician-patient privilege to insure that the
patients' records would be protected in accordance with the intentions of our statute"); In re Grand
Jury Investigation, 450 N.E.2d 678 (N.Y. 1983) (holding that hospital was permitted to assert privilege
on behalf of patient who was suspected of homicide); Boddy v. Parker, 358 N.Y.S.2d 218 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1974) (holding that hospital was not permitted to disclose privileged information without
patient's consent); In re June 1979 Allegheny County Investigating Grand Jury, 415 A.2d 73 (Pa.
1980) (holding hospital had standing to assert privilege because hospital owes patient duty to limit
access to records unless patient consents to disclosure).
307. 450 N.E.2d 678 (N.Y. 1983).
308. See id. at 680; see also Division of Med. Quality v. Gherardini, 156 Cal. Rptr. 55 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1979) (holding that hospital could assert privilege on behalf of patient who had not been notified
of request for records).
309. See, e.g., Hospital Corp. of America v. Superior Court, 755 P.2d 1198, 1200 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1988) ("[W]hen neither the patient nor the physician are parties to a proceeding in which discovery of
hospital records containing privileged information is sought, the hospital must assert the privilege.");
Commonwealth v. Fuller, 667 N.E.2d 847, 851-52 (Mass. 1996) (holding rape crisis center was
obligated to assert privilege); Moore v. St. John's Episcopal Hosp., 452 N.Y.S.2d 669, 670 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1982) (holding that hospital could not divulge patient records without express waiver of privilege
by patient); King v. O'Connor, 426 N.Y.S.2d 415, 417 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980) (enforcing physician-
patient privilege asserted by hospital and remarking "a hospital may not disclose the names and
addresses" of patients).
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recordholder. Even then, however, the court should ordinarily scrutinize the
claim of privilege. The party raising the privilege may be alerting the court to
a legitimate concern. For example, in Greet v. Zagrocki,31 ° the court
commented on the lack of standing but identified a route around the problem.
The city's law department asserted the psychotherapist-patient privilege for a
police officer named as a codefendant with the city in a civil rights action.
311
The court noted that the city could not claim the privilege on behalf of the
officer but that the court could raise the privilege on behalf of an absent
patient.312 The officer, who had not entered an appearance, was absent, so,
while denying standing to the city, the court nevertheless entertained the
claim of privilege.313
Two cases illustrate situations in which a court may have overlooked a
legitimate claim of privilege and disserved the goals of the privilege by
disposing of the case on grounds of standing. In State v. Moody,314 the state
asserted the privilege on behalf of the complainant in a criminal case. The
complainant alleged that the defendant, who was her stepfather at the time of
trial, had sexually abused her.315 She had participated in counseling sessions
with a clinical psychologist both individually and in a family group that
sometimes included the defendant.316 At trial, the defendant sought to call the
psychologist to testify to the complainant's statements concerning whether
she had been abused.317 The trial court ruled that the sessions at which the
defendant was not present were privileged, but the Supreme Judicial Court of
Maine disagreed.318 The court stressed that neither the complainant, her
father, her mother, nor her psychologist asserted the privilege and held that
the state's assertion was improper.319 The court failed to recognize that in the
particular circumstances of the case no competent party had the appropriate
relationship to raise the complainant's psychotherapist-patient privilege. The
complainant herself was only fourteen years old at the time of trial. The
complainant's mother had married the defendant after the complainant had
leveled her allegation of abuse at him. The psychologist neglected the
obligation to assert the privilege. In light of the complainant's immature age,
310. No. CIV. A. 96-2300, 1996 WL 724933 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 16, 1996).
311. Seeid at*1.
312. Seeid. at*2.
313. See id.
314. 486 A.2d 122 (Me. 1984).
315. Seeid. at 123.
316. See id
317. See id.
318. See id.
319. See id. at 124.
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her mother's conflict of interest, and the psychologist's unexplained failure to
assert the privilege, the court should have either entertained the state's
assertion of the complainant's privilege or remanded to have the court
appoint a guardian ad litem for the complainant to evaluate whether she
should invoke the privilege.
Similarly, in Goldstein v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co.,320 the
court took too narrow a view of standing. In Goldstein, the estate of a former
resident of the nursing home sued the nursing home's insurer, claiming that
the nursing home inadequately supervised a patient known to suffer from
Alzheimer's disease.32' The patient assaulted the decedent and caused
injuries that ultimately resulted in her death.322 Following the death, the
executor sought discovery of the medical records related to the resident who
committed the assault.323 Although the state had a legislatively-created health
care provider-patient privilege, the court concluded that the insurance
company lacked standing to raise the privilege. Therefore, the court did not
seriously entertain the arguments in favor of the privilege or, alternatively,
consider protective measures. 324 As in Moody, it appears that the patient was
incompetent to assert the privilege on his own behalf and that, unless
standing were extended to the insurance company, his interests would be
sacrificed.
325
A number of courts refuse to accord standing to a party invoking the
privilege when the circumstances signal that the assertion of privilege is
designed to serve a purpose that does not benefit the patient.326 Courts should
adopt an inclusive approach, which will better serve the purposes of the
320. 665 So. 2d 1267 (La. Ct. App. 1995).
321. See Id. at 1268.
322. See id.
323. See id. at 1268-69.
324. See id. at 1270.
325. The court noted that the resident had "not voiced any objections to the subpoena served on
him," but did not mention whether there was a guardian who was informed of the proceedings and
could determine whether to assert the privilege. Id. at 1270.
326. See, e.g., Goodwin v. State, 573 N.E.2d 895 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that criminal
defendant lacked standing to assert psychologist-patient privilege on behalf of prosecution witness); In
re Adoption of Diane, 508 N.E.2d 837 (Mass. 1987) (holding that mother resisting adoption of child
was not permitted to raise psychotherapist-patient privilege on behalf of child); Samson v. Saginaw
Prof'l Bldg., Inc., 224 N.W.2d 843 (Mich. 1975) (holding that landlord being sued for failing to
exercise reasonable care to protect other tenants from mental patients undergoing treatment in building
lacked standing to raise patients' privilege); People v. Lobaito, 351 N.W.2d 233 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984)
(holding that defendant not permitted to assert psychologist-patient privilege to exclude testimony of
son's psychologist); Eoff v. Hal & Charlie Peterson Found., 811 S.W.2d 187 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991)
(holding that plaintiff lacked standing to assert privilege on behalf of witness); State v. Echols, 449
N.W.2d 320 (Wisc. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that criminal defendant lacked standing to assert
psychologist-patient privilege on behalf ofprosecution witness).
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privilege, protecting against misuse of the privilege in ways other than by
adopting a narrow definition of standing. Even when the party asserting the
privilege has no apparent legitimate claim to standing, the court should assess
the claim of privilege rather than summarily rejecting it for lack of standing.
If the court fears that the assertion of privilege is improperly motivated, the
court should inquire further rather than simply dismissing the assertion as
having been made by an improper party. In some cases, appropriate inquiry
should lead the court to appoint a legal representative for a patient who is not
competent to assert or waive the privilege.
Even when asserting the privilege threatens the government's interest in
protecting the patient from injury, courts should recognize broad standing
and protect against abuse of the privilege by defining an appropriate
exception. Although the privilege should not bar governmental investigation
of allegations that the recordholder committed crimes against the patient, it
may protect some information despite the existence of such an
investigation.327 In the case of In re Grand Jury Proceedings [Doe],328 the
court explained its refusal to allow a hospital which was under investigation
for possible crimes against patients to assert the patients' physician-patient or
social worker-client privilege.329 The court stated:
A pragmatic limitation upon [the rule permitting someone other than
the patient to assert the privilege on the patient's behalf], which has
been given effect in our State, is that a person or entity subject to
proceedings for having committed crimes against an individual should
not be permitted to assert the victim's physician-patient privilege as a
bar to production of relevant medical records.
330
Courts should recognize such an exception but should construe it
narrowly. If the patient is not the victim of the suspected wrongdoing, the
court should recognize standing to raise the privilege, even when skeptical
327. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Dec. 14, 1984, 513 N.Y.S.2d 359,
363-64 (N.Y. 1987) (recognizing that Medicaid investigators are entitled to review privileged
information relevant to investigation, but protecting privileged information unnecessary to the
investigation).
328. 437 N.E.2d 1118 (N.Y. 1982).
329. See id. at 1120.
330. Id at 1120; see also People v. Doe, 410 N.Y.S.2d 233 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978) (prohibiting
nursing home under investigation in connection with suspected mistreatment of patients from invoking
physician-patient privilege of victims); State v. McGriff, 672 N.E.2d 1074 (Ohio CL App. 1996)
(prohibiting defendant physician from invoking physician-patient privilege to bar prosecution access to
relevant patient records). But see People v. Bickham, 431 N.E.2d 365 (Il1. 1982) (permitting physician
to assert patients' physician-patient privilege, since state had not claimed that investigation targeted
doctor's illegal conduct).
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about the reason for the assertion of privilege. The Lora court noted that,
given the widespread perception that the Board selected students on a
discriminatory basis, "it is highly unlikely that the fifty students to be
randomly selected from this group would acquiesce in the assertion of a
privilege by the very individuals alleged to have fostered such system-wide
bias,"33' and concluded the presumption of authority contained in proposed
Rule 504(c) is rebutted.332 Nevertheless, the court entertained the claim of
privilege advanced by the Board and enforced safeguards to protect the
interests of the students.333 Lora represents an appropriate approach.
The court should bypass the claim of privilege only if it is clearly
established that the party asserting the privilege does not speak for the
patient. For example, in State v. Chenette,334 the Vermont court held that the
defendant physician could not rely on his patients' physician-patient
privilege to exclude evidence in his prosecution for filing false claims. 35 The
court remarked, "While the [physician] has the power to invoke the privilege,
it is based on the presumption that he speaks for the patient. Once it is clear
that he does not speak for the patient, his power to invoke the privilege
ceases.' 336 In Chenette, the physician invoked the privilege long after the
recordholder delivered the records to the state, and, by the time the case came
before the court, the state had obtained waivers from all the patients.337 The
belated assertion of privilege could have no significance in light of the
patients' waivers. As a general matter, however, the court should not rely on
a lack of standing but should advance the privilege's purpose of protecting
the patient and rely on exceptions to the rule itself to prevent the privilege
from being converted into a shield for an abusive medical provider.
338
331. Lora v. Board of Educ., 74 F.KD. 565,586 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
332. See id.
333. See id. at 587.
334. 560 A.2d 365 (Vt. 1989).
335. See id. at 372-73.
336. Id at 373; see also United States v. Lowe, 948 F. Supp. 97, 100-01 (D. Mass. 1996)
(rejecting counseling center's assertion of client's privilege because client had executed written
waiver).
337. See State v. Chenette, 560 A.2d 265,372 (Vt. 1989).
338. See supra text accompanying notes 141-46. Difficulties often arise when relying on standing
arguments to avoid having a therapist who is under investigation rely on the patients' privilege to
stymie the government. See Commonwealth v. Kobrin, 479 N.E.2d 674 (Mass. 1985). In Kobrin, 27 of
the therapist's patients signed written forms invoking their psychiatrist-patient privilege. See id. at 676.
The court, therefore, was forced to look to other avenues to circumvent the privilege barrier. See id. at
680-81.
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B. The Use of In Camera Review
In addition to sculpting the contours of the psychotherapist-patient
privilege, courts must also define the procedures for evaluating claims of
privilege. Before enforcing a claim of privilege, courts will look to the
patient to establish that a psychotherapist-patient relationship existed and that
there is reason to believe the information sought falls within the privilege.
But one troublesome aspect of many privilege cases is the courts' willingness
to review the allegedly privileged information in camera before ruling.
Careless administration of the privilege undermines its effectiveness. Given
the personal nature of the protected information, even disclosure to the court
or the threat of such disclosure may discourage open and frank
communication.
339
In United States v. Zolin,340 the Supreme Court considered the role of in
camera review of allegedly privileged information. The Court cited two rules
that arguably restrict the use of in camera review of such information.34' The
Court concluded that the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client
privilege would be eviscerated if in camera review were categorically
forbidden. 42 The evidence that the attorney's services were obtained in
furtherance of a crime or fraud will often lie only in the allegedly privileged
material. Therefore, the Court held that in camera review would sometimes
be appropriate and outlined the procedure trial courts should employ to
assess the applicability of the crime-fraud exception. 43 Acknowledging the
harmful effects of in camera review, the Court refused to allow in camera
review until the party challenging the claim of privilege made a threshold
showing that there is a factual basis for a good faith belief that in camera
review may reveal evidence that the crime-fraud exception applies. 3"
Zolin by no means suggests that a court's in camera review of allegedly
privileged material should be routine. The court should not resort to in
339. The likelihood of negative impact is greater because the therapist often has an ethical duty to
inform the client of the limits on the protection of the privacy of the relationship. See supra notes 30-
32 and accompanying text.
340. 491 U.S. 554 (1989).
341. Rule 104(a) states, "In making its determination (the court] is not bound by the rules of
evidence except those with respect to privileges." Id. at 565 (citing FED. P, EviD. 104(a)). Rule
1101(c) provides, "The rule with respect to privileges applies at all stages of all actions, cases, and
proceedings." Id. (citing FED. R. EVID. 1101(c)).
342. Seeid.at568.
343. See id. at 573-74.
344. See generally Rachel A. Hurtzel, Note, Evidence: The Crime Fraud Exception to Attorney-
Client Privilege-United States v. Zolin, 15 U. DAYTON L. REV. 365 (1990) (examining effect of Zolin
on attorney-client privilege).
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camera review unless information essential to the ruling can be found only in
the allegedly privileged records and the party seeking access makes a
threshold showing. In administering the psychotherapist-patient privilege,
courts will sometimes encounter a plausible argument that in camera review
would advance the inquiry.345 Generally, however, the review is appropriate
only after an initial showing that an exception applies. Unlike the crime-fraud
exception to the attorney-client privilege, the standard exceptions to the
psychotherapist-patient privilege derive from the context rather than the
content of the communications. Without examining the records, the court can
assess whether communications are being offered in a proceeding for
hospitalization, whether they occurred in a court-ordered examination, or
whether the patient-litigant exception may apply. Once the court knows that
an exception applies, it may employ in camera review to identify the relevant
parts of the records, denying access to the irrelevant portions, and
maintaining as much protection of the patient's privacy as possible. Thus, in
camera review plays a legitimate role in assessing the appropriate extent of
disclosure, but only after the privilege has first been overcome.
Cases reveal that courts overuse in camera review in evaluating claims of
psychotherapist-patient privilege. In a number of cases applying the
privilege, courts appear to use in camera review of records primarily to
determine whether the records were relevant or important enough to be
disclosed, and in doing so, have inspected allegedly privileged documents
before determining that they were not privileged.346
Moreover, knowing the contents of the privileged documents may sway
the court in other matters in the proceeding, and some courts' rulings appear
influenced by the contents of the records reviewed in camera. For example,
in D.C. v. S.A., 347 the plaintiff raised the privilege in a personal injury case,
345. For example, if courts recognize an exception for protective disclosure when the therapeutic
communications reveal that the patient presents a threat to a third party, the court may need to consider
the content of the communication to determine whether disclosure was necessary. See, e.g., United
States v. Glass, 133 F.3d 1356 (10th Cir. 1998). In Glass, the court recognized the psychotherapist-
patient privilege could be overcome by a threat of harm but held that the district court had not
considered sufficient information in concluding that the privilege was overcome. See id. at 1359-60.
The court remanded for consideration of whether the seriousness of the threat communicated to the
therapist and the circumstances of the case warranted disclosure. See id. at 1360. See generally
WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 37, § 5549 (discussing protective disclosures).
346. See, e.g., United States v. Haworth, 168 F.R.D. 660 (D.N.M. 1996); Price v. San Diego, 165
F.R.D. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1996); D.C. v. S.A., 670 N.E.2d 1136 (11. App. Ct. 1996); see also, e.g., State v.
Moody, 486 A.2d 122 (Me. 1984) (court used voir dire at trial to determine whether testimony was
privileged, giving both parties full access to allegedly privileged conversations; court then ruled
knowing that psychologist testified in voir dire that complainant failed to confirm allegations in private
therapy sessions).
347. 670N.E.2d 1136.
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while the defendant argued patient-litigant exception. The trial court then
reviewed the records in camera and stated that, while some were privileged,
"there are things there that... relate pretty directly to [the] accident. ' 348 In a
ruling later affirmed on appeal,3 49 the trial court held that the plaintiff had
placed his mental state in issue by pleading negligence and ordered the
records disclosed. If the privileged communications are inconsistent with the
patient's deposition or trial testimony, the court may be reluctant to enforce
the privilege. Even if the statements were made outside a fact-oriented setting
and may represent subjective statements suitable to therapy but not to the
courtroom, the court may feel that to enforce the privilege would permit the
patient to subvert the truth-seeking process. In Price v. City of San Diego,350
the defendant argued that the plaintiff's mental health records would reveal
that she had not been truthful and, after conducting an in camera review, the
magistrate ordered disclosure of the records, remarking that they were
relevant to the issue of the patient's credibility.
351
Inquiry directed to assessing the relevance of privileged records is no
longer appropriate after Jaffee. Courts must adjust and respect the claim of
privilege when arriving at a ruling. Review of allegedly privileged records is
inappropriate until the privilege has been overcome, except in the small
number of cases in which the court needs to review the records to resolve
their status and does so in accordance with the procedures described in Zolin.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court recognized the psychotherapist-patient privilege in
Jaffee, and, therefore, the federal courts must undertake the task of defining
the scope and application of the privilege. As a common-law privilege, the
psychotherapist-patient privilege will necessarily take shape case by case, but
courts must execute the task of defining the privilege as expeditiously as
possible to permit professionals in counseling relationships to ascertain the
348. Id. at 1138.
349. The intermediate appellate court first reversed the trial court, holding that the plaintiff did not
place his mental state in issue. See id. at 1140. The Supreme Court of Illinois agreed, but reversed on
the ground that "fundamental fairness commands that the privilege yield." D.C. v. S.A., 687 N.E.2d
1032, 1040-41 (11. 1997).
350. 165 F.R.D. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1996).
351. See id. at 623; see also State v. Moody, 486 A.2d 122 (Me. 1984) (trial court permitted
attorneys to conduct voir dire of psychologist and appellate court concluded that since no party with
standing had asserted privilege, privileged communications inconsistent with complainant's
allegations were admissible). But see Webb v. Quincy City Lines, Inc., 219 N.E.2d 165, 167 (IIl. App.
Ct. 1966) (rejecting defendant's argument, based in part on contents of privileged records, that not to
find waiver is to "exclude evidence indicating a malingering and exaggerating plaintiff without
corresponding public benefits").
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extent to which the law shields the communications and other information
that they receive.
The first question raised by Jaffee is which counselors are covered by the
privilege. This Article advocates that the privilege extends only to fully
credentialed counselors such as psychiatrists, psychologists, and master's
level social workers. Jaffee should not be read as opening the door to a
privilege for all counseling relationships. The purposes of the privilege is to
foster counseling that benefits both the client and society, and it is best served
if the counselor providing therapy has advanced professional training. In
addition, fully credentialed counselors are bound by professional codes
requiring confidentiality and are inculcated with a sense of professionalism.
Courts should not assume that anyone claiming the title "counselor" offers a
therapeutic benefit to the client Moreover, courts should not embark on a
course that would require individual assessment of the competence of each
individual counselor or even each class of counselors. Instead, courts should
extend the psychotherapist-patient privilege only to the therapists who most
clearly serve its purpose and leave the question of whether communications
to other types of counselors are privileged for the legislature.
Second, courts should extend the privilege not only to communications
between the patient and therapist for therapy or diagnosis but also to patient-
identifying information. Any disclosure that a patient has received
psychotherapy threatens the interest in fostering such treatment. When
patient-identifying information is sought, courts should balance the need for
disclosure against the threat to the interests protected by the privilege. In
doing so, courts should consider the use of protective measures that
accommodate the need for the information while shielding the patient's
privacy.
Third, courts should adopt a conservative approach toward waiver of the
privilege. To advance the protected interests, courts should apply the patient-
litigant exception narrowly, holding that the patient has placed mental state in
issue only when clear from the patient's pleadings. Further, courts should
reject the argument that situations such as recordkeeping by providers or the
exchange of records for third party payment, inherent to modem systems of
providing mental health care, defeat the privilege.
Fourth, courts should adopt a broad definition of standing. Courts should
recognize that confidential information is often held by an entity other than
the patient or therapist and that a restrictive concept of standing would
undermine the effect of the privilege.
Fifth, courts must follow protective procedures for evaluating claims of
psychotherapist-patient privilege. Too often, in assessing claims of
psychotherapist-patient privilege, courts fail to observe the procedures
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required for allegedly privileged material, engaging in casual and
unwarranted in camera review of the contested material. Courts should
accord information shielded by the psychotherapist-patient privilege the
protection extended to other privileged information and employ in camera
review only when both necessary and warranted.
If the courts adopt these suggestions, they will both effectuate the goals of
Jaffee and avoid prolonging the uncertainty that attends ad hoc development
of privilege law. The suggested approach focuses the psychotherapist-patient
privilege on the relationships in which its protection is most justified and
gives the privilege full force in those counseling relationships.
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